Michigan Law Review
Volume 97

Issue 5

1999

Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses
Richard A. Nagareda
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
Evidence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1999).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECONCEIVING THE RIGHT TO
PRESENT WITNESSES

Richard A. Nagareda*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I.

A.

B.

C.

II.

B.
C.

D.

. • • • • • • • • .

• • • • • • •

.
From Compulsion to Admissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From Equality to Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Discriminatory Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Generally Applicable Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Arbitrariness of an "Arbitrary or
Disproportionate" Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Court on Its Own Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Exceptions and Floodgates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

FROM EXCEPTION TO EQUALITY.
A.

III.

• • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • .

THE CuRRENT LANDSCAPE

• . . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • •

Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Textual Forerunners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Contemporaneous Evidence Law . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The First Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Confrontation Clause . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Institutional Structure and Related
Constitutional "Compartments" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Structuring the Making of Rules . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Exceptions and Equality Elsewhere . . . . . . . .
Protecting Defendants in Practical Terms . . . . . . .

IMPLICATIONS

• • • • • • • • • • • • • .

• • • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • . • • • • • •

The Case Law Reconsidered . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .
B. Equal Treatment and the Federal Rules of
Evidence . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Rule 804(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Rule 412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION .
A.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .

. . • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • •

1064
1072
1072
1075
1075
1080
1088
1089
1098
1108
1110
1110
1113
1117
1118
1124
1124
1134
1137
1141
1141
1146
1146
1148
1151

* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1985, Stanford; J.
D.
1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. Ronald Carlson, Dan Coenen, Anne Dupre, Ruth
Nagareda, and Michael Wells provided helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1063

1064

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

97:1063

INTRODUCTION

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments.
For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply dis
tinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and
criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these
three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of
the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers
routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting ques
tions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single com
partment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the
lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant,
but relatively neglected, area that lies at the intersection of evi
dence, the Constitution, and crime.
For more than three decades, the Supreme Court has recognized
a constitutional right on the part of criminal defendants to present
witnesses.1 Although this right is not set forth explicitly in the text
of the Constitution itself, the Court correctly has regarded it as a
necessary implication of the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.2 As such, the right is an integral part of the
constitutional guarantees that a criminal defendant may invoke to
override the ordinary rules of evidence, whether in the form of stat
utes or common law decisions - in essence, to tum a dispute
within the law of evidence into a constitutional case.3
The right to present witnesses, however, tends to slip through
the cracks of the conventional curriculum. Given its limitation to
criminal trials, the right does not come up in standard constitutional
1. The first explicit articulation of the right in these terms appears in Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
2. In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." U. S. CoNST.amend. VI. On the derivation of the right to present witnesses from the
right to compulsory process, see infra section I.A. At various times, the Court also has
pointed to other sources for the right to present witnesses, including implications from the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination (at least when the witness in question con·
sists of the defendant herself) and notions of adversarial fairness implicit in the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S.44, 51-53 (1987).
On the possible distinction between the defendant-as-witness and third-party defense wit·
nesses, see infra section I.C.1.b (rejecting such a distinction). On due process, see infra sec·
tion II.C. 1.b (arguing that due process adds nothing to the content of the right to present
witnesses but, instead, serves simply as the vehicle for incorporation of that right against the
states).

3. The other significant constitutional override is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."). On the lessons to be
drawn from the Confrontation Clause for the proper parameters of the right to present wit·
nesses, see infra section 11.B.
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law courses; nor, given its evidentiary overlay, does it arise in stan
dard criminal procedure courses. Even within the realm of evi
dence pedagogy, the right barely achieves mention.

With rare

exception, the editors of the leading evidence casebooks do not dis
cuss the major Supreme Court decisions on the right as a distinct
line of analysis.4 They typically content themselves, instead, to in
clude a single decision in the line and, even then, to focus largely
upon the particular kind of testimony in dispute.5 This omission is
one of many that results from the curricular compartmentalization
of the Constitution and that, in turn, carries over into the world of
legal scholarship.6 This article seeks,

if

nothing else, to build the

case to rectify this omission.

It comes as no surprise that the Court has invoked the right in
order to strike down the application of evidence rules that pecu
liarly disadvantage criminal defendants with regard to the presenta
tion of witness testimony.7 More surprisingly, the Court also has
invoked the right to invalidate, as applied to criminal defendants, at
least some rules of evidence that are generally applicable - that is,
rules that restrict the admission of a particular type of witness testi
mony, whether offered by the prosecution or the defense.8 Under
the Court's current approach, evidence rules that operate to pre4. One notable exception is RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATER

IALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 849-71 (4th ed. 1997).

5. Several recent casebooks include Rock, but the editors do so simply as part of a discus
sion of witness competency. See, e.g., Eruc D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESsON, PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 388 (2d ed. 1994); CHruSTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KlRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RUJ.ES 541 (3d ed. 1996); JoHN F. SurroN,
JR. & OLIN GuY WELLBORN III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 404 (8th ed. 1996);
JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL, EVIDENCE 256 (9th ed. 1997). One casebook goes a small step
further by also including Chambers v. Mississipp� 410 U.S. 284 (1973), concerning statements
contrary to penal interest, but the editors do so as part of a separate section on the constitu
tional grounds for the admission of hearsay. See MUELLER & KlRKPATRICK, supra, at 451.
Another recent casebook mentions only Chambers in a similar light. See RONALD J. ALLEN
ET AL, EVIDENCE: Tmcr, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 322 (2d ed. 1997).
6. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1131 (1991); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary - The Canons of Constitutional
Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 963, 1012 (1998); Howard W.Gutman, Academic Determinism: The
Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 295, 327-31 (1981).
7. See Washington v.Texas, 388 U.S.14, 16 (1967) (striking down state evidence rule that
disqualified accomplices as witnesses for defense, but not as witnesses for prosecution).
8. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (striking down per se prohibition upon
hypnotically-enhanced testimony, as applied to bar defendant herself from testifying); Cham
bers, 410 U.S. at 299 (striking down hearsay exception for statements against interest that
permitted statements against pecuniary interest but not those against penal interest, as ap
plied to bar third-party defense witnesses). But see United States v.Scheffer, 118 S.Ct.1261
{1998) {upholding per se prohibition upon expert scientific testimony concerning polygraph
examination).
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vent the presentation of defense witnesses "may not be arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."9
has

This constitutional override to the ordinary rules of evidence
assumed even greater significance in recent years, as

rulemakers have grappled increasingly with new forms of witness
testimony that stem from developments in modem science. The
Court's two most recent decisions on the right, for example, focused
upon rules that categorically excluded, respectively, hypnotically
enhanced testimony10 and expert scientific testimony concerning
the results of polygraph examinations.11 In these cases, the Court
reached starkly divergent results, striking down the former rule as
applied to a criminal defendant, but upholding the latter. Whatever
its content, the right to present witnesses undoubtedly

will

play a

key role in the disputes that are bound to arise from the science and
technology of witness testimony in the twenty-first century.
The prospect of confronting the evidence disputes of the future
within the parameters of the Court's current case law is not auspi
cious. As I explain, the Court's decisions in the area - especially
when read in light of the Court's most recent decision, from last
Term, in

United States v. Scheffer12 -

form an incoherent, contra

dictory body of law. That, in itself, would be reason enough for
commentators to concern themselves with the subject, which sur
prisingly has garnered little fresh attention in recent years. The
mid-1970s saw substantial articles by two leading commentators Peter Westen and Robert Clinton - on the then-developing right
to present witnesses.13 Indeed, the authors of a subsequent treatise
on exculpatory evidence describe their work as "essentially an ex
tended footnote to" the Westen and Clinton articles.14 No com
mentator in the past two decades, however, has sought to question
the conventional understanding of the right as a matter of first prin
ciples. Nor has anyone sought to integrate the Court's recent think9. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56; see also Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1264.
10. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
11. See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1265·66.
1 2. 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
13. See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974) [here·
inafter Westen, Compulsory Process l]; Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 191 (1975) [hereinafter Westen, Compulsory Process 11]; Robert N. Clinton, The Right
to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L.
REv. 711 (1976); see also Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified
Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 567 (1978) [hereinafter Westen,
Unified Theory].
14. See EDWARD J. lMwINKELRIED & NoRMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
xiii (2d ed. 1996).
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ing on the subject with contemporary scholarship on other,
conceptually similar questions of constitutional law that lie outside
the compartments of evidence and criminal procedure.15 These are
the objectives of this article.
To that end, I contend that the Court's "arbitrary or dispropor
tionate" standard is not simply flawed in application but that the
standard fundamentally misconceives the nature of the right to
present witnesses. Under the Court's current approach - indeed,
in the view of all modem commentators - the right consists of an
entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules of evi
dence, though the actual availability of an exception in a given in
stance has tended to tum recently upon ad hoc judgments by the
Court itself.
One should not dismiss the ad hoc nature of the Court's recent
jurisprudence simply as a sign of sloppy judging or ideological
sleight-of-hand; rather, one should see it as a symptom of a much
deeper and well-founded discomfort on the part of the Court with
the implications that an "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard
would have for the law of evidence,

if taken seriously.

The concep

tion of a constitutional right as an entitlement to exceptions from
generally applicable rules raises what one commentator aptly de
scribes, in other constitutional contexts, as "the floodgates prob
lem":16

namely, the challenge of articulating some principled

stopping point for the recognition of exceptions in order to avoid
tearing apart the system of rules itself. It is this problem, I submit,
that best accounts for - though it does not justify - the Court's ad
hoc reasoning on the right to present witnesses. An exception
based view of the right to present witnesses, in particular, would
throw into doubt such familiar features of evidence law as the rule
against hearsay, limitations upon the use of extrinsic evidence for
purposes of witness impeachment, and rules of privilege.

In describing the Court's recent output in these terms, I seek to
highlight still another kind of compartmentalization - one

within

15. Akhil Amar takes on such an enterprise with respect to most of the· constitutional
rights that deal with matters of criminal procedure. See AKmL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITU
TION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997). Even his otherwise sweeping
treatment, however, devotes precious little attention to the right to present witnesses specifi
cally, see id. at 136, though he does make several important points with regard to the meaning
of the Compulsory Process Clause. The portions of Amar's book that discuss the Clause
repeat, essentially verbatim, the analysis presented in an earlier article. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Foreword - Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641, 698 (1996). For ease
of reference, I shall cite hereafter only to the book.
16. Michael C. Dorf,
1175, 1180 (1996).

Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights,

109 l!ARv. L. REv.
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the realm of constitutional law. Many of the rights protected by the
Constitution consist of either entitlements to exceptions or de
mands for equal treatment. To take a well-settled example, the
holding of

Washington v. Davis11 is

that a generally applicable law

does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it has
a disproportionate impact upon the members of a racial minority there, African Americans. This is so because the content of the
constitutional right - as its name suggests - is itself equality
based, not exception-based. What compartment one is in thus has
tremendous significance for the application of the Constitution. It
is not surprising, then, that one of the most controversial constitu
tional decisions in recent years - the Court's 1990 decision in Em
ployment Division v. Smith18 on the Free Exercise Clause consists, at bottom, of a determination to switch a constitutional
right from one compartment to the other. The upshot of

Smith is to

reject the preexisting understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as
an entitlement to exceptions for religious practice19 in favor of a
view that makes religious practitioners subject to generally applica
ble laws
there, a criminal prohibition upon possession of the
drug peyote.20
-·

The switch effected by

Smith

understandably has elicited a

wealth of academic commentary21 - not to mention an unsuccess
ful congressional effort to switch back, by statute, to an exception
based view.22 But scholars have devoted comparatively little atten
tion to the even more provocative project of identifying areas in
17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. I refer here to the Court's rhetoric in framing the constitutional standard for free
exercise cases prior to Smith in terms of a demand for a compelling state interest. See Sher
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). As noted by commentators on both sides of the free
exercise debate, in terms of actual application, even the pre-Smith Court rarely gave this
exacting standard real bite. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congres
sional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. F lores, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 99102; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1109, 1127 (1990).
20.

See Smith,

494 U.S. at 874.

21. This vast literature is beyond the scope of the present article. For thoughtful defenses
of Smith, see, for example, Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 19; Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245 (1994); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308 (1991). For thoughtful criticism of
Smith, see, for example, Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance ofthe Religion Clauses, 102
YALE LJ. 1611 (1993); McConnell, supra note 19.
22. See City of Boerne v. F lores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act-which would have restored the compelling interest test for gov
ernment-imposed burdens upon religious exercise-as in excess of the remedial power
granted to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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which the Court has erroneously

declined to switch a constitutional

right from the exception to the equality compartment. The right to
present witnesses, I submit, is a striking example of such an error.
Specifically, I argue that a wide array of sources - the historical
context of the Compulsory Process Clause, recent learning on the
closely related Confrontation Clause, considerations of institutional
structure, the Court's approach to conceptually similar problems of
constitutional law, and sheer practical concern for the protection of
criminal defendants as a whole - together form a compelling case
to reconceive the right as one of equal treatment. Under the ap
proach set forth here, the Court should apply strict scrutiny - in
the familiar sense of a demand for a compelling governmental inter
est - with respect to evidence rules that peculiarly disadvantage
criminal defendants. By contrast, when the rule in question is an
evenhanded one - when the government, as rulemaker, has deter
mined to restrict the presentation of witness testimony by the gov
ernment itself as prosecutor in the same manner as it limits the
defense at trial - the Court generally should apply the far more
deferential standard of ordinary rationality review.
The analysis in support of this view proceeds in three parts. Part

I presents an overview of the current landscape, explaining initially
how a right to compulsory process under the terms of the Sixth
Amendment necessarily implies a right to present witnesses. Draw
ing upon the leading Supreme Court cases in the area, this Part
then details how the Court has come to understand the right to
present witnesses as an entitlement to exceptions from generally
applicable evidence rules. Part I finally focuses upon the Court's
latest decision, in

United States v. Scheffer.

I contend that, although

the Court is correct to regard a per se ban on polygraph evidence as
constitutionally permissible -

if not necessarily

wise evidence pol

icy - the Court's reasoning amounts to an ad hoc,judgment that is
not only contrary to precedent but also unsupportable by reference
to any of the three substantive propositions relied upon in the opin
ion. This ad hoc quality, as suggested earlier, is explicable as part of
a justified fear that an "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard,

if

applied seriously, would require a radical rethinking of many set
tled principles of evidence law. The disappointment of

Scheffer lies

in the Court's apparent willingness to act upon this genuine concern
without questioning explicitly the underlying conception of the
right that has given it life.
Part II sets forth the affirmative case for reeonceiving the right
to present witnesses as a right to equal treatment. Focusing upon
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the historical context of the Compulsory Process Clause, this Part
initially concurs with the view of modern commentators that the
forerunners of the Clause in state constitutions and in the proposals
advanced for the Bill of Rights - though somewhat illuminating do not point squarely in favor of either an exception-based or an
equality-based view. Both modern commentators and the Supreme
Court, however, have overlooked a crucial feature of the historical
context: In the late eighteenth century, it was uniformly the law,
both

in the

various states and in English criminal trials, that crimi

nal defendants were disqualified from testifying under oath as wit
nesses in their own defense.
This feature of then-contemporary evidence law - shocking to
the modern eye - sheds considerable light upon the proper con
ception of the right to present witnesses. Specifically, it indicates
that the most egregious sort of violation, under an exception-based
view of the right, actually was the prevailing practice at the time
that the Bill of Rights was ratified and for several decades after
ward. The disqualification of criminal defendants, however, did not
arise as a way peculiarly to disadvantage such persons. Instead, this
limitation was part of a generally applicable disqualification of all
interested persons to appear as witnesses, whether for the prosecu
tion or the defense. The only way to explain the uniformity of this
practice at the time of the Bill of Rights - indeed, the only way to
account for the conspicuous lack of the slightest indication that the
Bill was thought by its contemporaries to require a change in pre
vailing evidence practice - is to understand the right to present
witnesses as a right to equal treatment.
This is, most definitely, not to say that the Constitution freezes
into place the eighteenth century law of evidence. Quite to the con
trary, the historical record strongly supports the view that the
Founding generation23 left considerable room for an evolving law of
evidence, receptive to change and adaptation in light of modern
thinking and conditions. What makes the disqualification of crimi
nal defendants violative of the right to present witnesses is that the
common law of evidence subsequently, in the nineteenth century,
removed virtually all disqualifications of witnesses. At that point,
the Supreme Court rightly found a constitutional violation with re
spect to the one state that persisted in barring defendants as wit
nesses, notwithstanding its lifting of virtually all other limitations
23. I use the term "Founding generation" rather than the more common "Founders," for
speak here not just of those who drafted the Constitution itself but, more generally, of the
generation contemporaneous to the establishment of the Constitution.
I

Right to Present Witnesses

March 1999]

1071

upon witness qualification.24 But the source of the violation lies in
the structure of the state rule, not in judicial application of a free
standing notion of arbitrariness.
Part II further explains that, apart from historical context, an
equality-based conception of the right to present witnesses dove
tails with recent learning on the Confrontation Clause and is consis
tent with the Court's decisions on the Due Process Clause as a
guarantee of adversarial fairness in criminal trials. This Part then
presents two additional justifications for an equality-based view,
one institutional and the other practical. An important institutional
consequence of such a view is to enable the makers of evidence
rules - today, typically legislatures - to deploy their comparative
advantage in culling through information for the making of com
plex empirical judgments, especially with respect to controversial
new forms of witness testimony on the cutting edge of science.
Courts, by contrast, can deploy their comparative advantage in en
suring that the decisionmaking process by which judgments of evi
dence policy are made gives criminal defendants a fair shake specifically, by insisting that, whatever the rule selected, it must be
evenhanded, absent a compelling justification otherwise. There is
good reason to believe that the government is acting out of a genu
ine policy concern - not simply to advantage its own prosecutors
vis-a-vis criminal defendants - when the government itself is pre
pared to disavow completely the use of a particular type of witness
testimony.
This insight, in tum, distinguishes the switch advocated here from an exception-based to an equality-based conception of the
right to present witnesses - from the more controversial switch of
the same sort effected by

Smith

for the Free Exercise Clause.

There, a demand for generally applicable rules is far more suscepti
ble to criticism, for such rules - like the criminal prohibition upon
peyote in

Smith

itself - typically

will

have little practical bite for

the vast majority of the public. Generally applicable evidence rules,
virtually by definition, restrict the prosecution in the same manner
as they do the defense.
One need not take a rosy view of evidence policymaking, how
ever, to embrace an equality-based view. Simply as a practical mat
ter, wholly apart from the niceties of constitutional doctrine, the
more one distrusts the ability of policymakers to accord appropriate
weight to the interests of criminal defendants, the less attractive the
24. See infra section I.B.1 (discussing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961)).
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current, exception-based view becomes. If anything, as I explain,
the practical consequences of current law may be to make it all the
more difficult to detect the tilting of the playing field against de
fendants, insofar as the Court's stance encourages the making of
admissibility determinations on a case-by-case basis. Such a view
leaves policymakers free - indeed, it encourages them

-·

to de

cline to enact per se exclusionary rules that, in many of their appli
cations, would be highly protective of criminal defendants. Simply
as a matter of whose ox is gored, it is impossible to defend the sta
tus quo on the ground that it makes defendants as a whole better
off.
Part III applies the right to present witnesses, understood as a
demand for equal treatment, to the Court's existing case law. I then
discuss the constitutionality of some familiar features of the Federal
Rules of Evidence that are conspicuously not evenhanded.
I.

THE CuRRENT LANDSCAPE

For nearly two centuries after its enactment, the Compulsory
Process Clause elicited little attention. "Until 1967 the Supreme
Court addressed it only five times, twice in dictum and three times
while declining to construe it."25 Since then, the Court has taken
two significant analytical steps. The first consists of reading the
Clause not only to bear upon "compulsory process" in the literal
sense of bringing witnesses to court under the compulsion of law,
but also to concern the admissibility of witness testimony - includ
ing the testimony of persons who need no legal compulsion to ap
pear. This first step is correct. The second step, however, consists
of reading the Clause to confer upon criminal defendants an entitle
ment to the admission of witness testimony, even in the face of gen
erally applicable evidence rules. This second step, I argue, is in
error; and the consequences of that error become glaringly appar
ent when one considers the Court's most recent effort to under
stand the right to present witnesses.
A.

From Compulsion to Admissibility

The Compulsory Process Clause, at the very least, requires the
government to permit criminal defendants to avail themselves of
the same rules of process - in the literal sense of service of process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in court - as are available to
the prosecution. Oddly enough, notions of compulsory process in
25.

Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 108 (citing cases).
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this most obvious sense initially developed in England not as a
means by which to secure the testimony of recalcitrant witnesses
but, instead, to protect persons who were entirely willing to testify.
Absent legal compulsion to testify, persons other than parties or
counsel were vulnerable to lawsuits for "maintenance" by the party
against whom they testified26 - in colloquial terms, a cause of ac
tion for being a busybody.
Under the reign of Elizabeth I in the sixteenth century, Parlia
ment sought to rectify the problem by providing that witnesses do
not simply have a duty to respond to compulsory process in civil
actions but, more importantly, that they have a
to

testify,

unmolested

by

"right to

come and

the apprehension of maintenance

proceedings."27 When English law subsequently extended notions
of compulsory process for the benefit of criminal defendants, that
move came simply as a way to apply the same set of ground rules as
between the prosecution and the defense. As John Henry Wigmore
explained in his famous treatise on the common law of evidence:

In criminal causes, the date when process began to be issued for the

Crown's witnesses does not appear; though presumably it preceded
the time of Elizabeth's statute. But the accused in a criminal cause
was not allowed to have witnesses at all, - much less to have compul
sory process for them. By the early 1600s this disqualification began
to disappear, and the accused was occasionally allowed to put on wit
nesses, who spoke without oath. After two generations, and by 1679,
under the Restoration, the judges began to grant him, by special or
der, compulsory process to bring them; and finally, at slow intervals,
in 1695 and in 1701, he was guaranteed this right by general statutes.
This guarantee was afterwards embodied in most of the constitutions
of the [various states within] the United States.2s
Wigmore found the reference to "compulsory process" in the Sixth
Amendment to "provide[ ] nothing new or exceptional"; it merely
"gave solid sanction, in the special case of accused persons, to the
26. See 3 JoHN HENRY W1GMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
COMMON LAW § 2190, at 2960 (1st ed. 1904) ("[A]nybody who was not somehow con
cerned as a party or a counsel in the cause ran the risk, if he came forward to testify to the
jury, of being afterwards sued for maintenance by the party against whom he had spoken.").
I cite thloughout to the first edition of Wigmore's treatise, rather than to its more recent
descendants, because the first edition contains the most detailed exposition of the co=on
law of evidence - particularly as it stood at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
27. Id. § 2190, at 2962 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. § 2190, at 2963 (footnotes omitted); see also id. § 2191, at 2964 ("[T]he purpose of
the [English] statutes was merely to cure the defect of the co=on law by giving to parties
defendant in criminal cases the co=on right which was al!eady in custom possessed both by
parties in civil cases and by the prosecution in criminal cases."). For a similar account of the
history behind the Compulsory Process Clause, see 3 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1786, at 662-66 (New York, Da Capo Press 1970)
(1833).
AT
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procedure ordinarily practised and recognized for witnesses in gen
eral. "29 Apparently speaking only to the process for obtaining wit
nesses, Wigmore added that the Compulsory Process Clause "does
not override and abolish such

exemptions and privileges

as may be

otherwise recognized by common law or statute"30 - that is, "ex
emptions and privileges" that would prevent even the prosecution
from compelling a given witness to appear in court.
On its face, the Compulsory Process Clause does not speak spe
cifically to the admissibility of witness testimony. But both the
Supreme Court and modem commentators have correctly under
stood the Clause to bear upon questions of admissibility as well as
the bringing of witnesses into court under compulsion of law. The
Court logically observes that it would be odd "to commit the futile
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."31 To label such
an act as completely "futile" is something of an overstatement, for
the defense might use compulsory process simply to make contact
with a recalcitrant individual and then to use the information
gleaned therefrom to identify admissible testimony from other wit
nesses. The Court is correct, however, that such a limited notion of
compulsory process would make little sense. The Compulsory Pro
cess Clause itself refers to the obtaining of "witnesses" - a term
that, in ordinary parlance, refers to persons who testify in court, not
to those whom a party might contact simply for the purpose of pre
trial investigation. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment as a whole
speaks to the procedures for criminal trials, not to pre-trial
investigation.
Along similar lines, Akhil Amar reasons that:

[i]f the accused, in order to show his innocence, is generally empow
ered to drag a human being, against her will, into the courtroom to
tell the truth, surely he must also enjoy the lesser-included rights to
present other truthful evidence that in no way infringes on another
human being's autonomy. These lesser-included rights are plainly
presupposed by the compulsory process clause.32
The primary repository of these rights "presupposed" by the Clause
is the law of evidence.
Based upon history and the implications from the constitutional
text, two propositions thus emerge as starting points: First, the
29.
30.
31.
32.

3 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 2191, at 2965.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
AMAR, supra note 15, at 132.
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Compulsory Process Clause necessarily assumes that criminal de
fendants have some set of rights with respect to the admissibility of
witness testimony; and, second, given the development of compul
sory process as a means to protect willing witnesses as well as to
coerce unwilling ones, it is not appropriate to distinguish between
the two sorts of witnesses for purposes of admissibility. A crucial
question remains: Given the recognition that the Clause bears not
only upon the process of witness compulsion but also upon issues of
admissibility, should the Supreme Court apply to the latter category
of questions the same principle of equality that governs with respect
to the former? As I now explain, the Court has consciously de
clined to do so.

B.

From Equality to Exception

The Court's current framework for the right to present wit
nesses focuses not upon the evenhandedness of the evidence rule in
dispute but, instead, upon whether application of the rule whatever its structure - would be "arbitrary or disproportionate"
in light of its justi:fication.33 The Court arrived at this approach
through a circuitous route, however.

1.

Discriminatory Rules

The cases in which the Court first began to intimate the exist
ence of a constitutional right to present witnesses -

Georgia34

and

Washington

v.

Texas35

Ferguson

v.

- dealt with evidence rules

that were flagrantly discriminatory as to criminal defendants. The
Court nonetheless did not ground its analysis upon this feature of
the rules, and the consequences of the Court's refusal have become
increasingly apparent in more recent decisions.

Ferguson concerned, albeit indirectly, a Georgia statute that dis
qualified criminal defendants from testifying under oath in their de
fense.36 Although Georgia had "in 1866 abolished by statute the
common-law rules of incompetency for most other persons," the
state had the curious distinction of being "the only jurisdiction in
the common-law world," as of 1961, to retain a disqualification for
defendants.37 In an effort to mitigate the harshness of this remain33. See supra note 9.
34. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
35. 388 U.S. 14 {1967).
36. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 573.
37. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570. In a narrow, technical respect, this disqualification might
seem evenhanded, in the sense that the defendant is disqualified from testifying under oath
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ing disqualification, the state permitted the defendant to make an
unswom statement to the jury, although defense counsel could not
help to elicit such a statement through prompting or examination. 38
Even this meager concession was not given evenhandedly. If the
unswom statement referred to facts that tended to suggest guilt,
"the prosecution [would be] relieved of the necessity of proving

[those facts] by evidence of its own"; but if the statement was help
ful to the defense, the trial judge could "sua sponte instruct the jury
to treat the accused's explanation as not presenting a defense in
law."39

Ferguson would be a very straightforward case today. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine a more egregious violation of the right to present
witnesses, irrespective of whether one takes an exception-based or
an equality-based view. The Court, however, reversed the defend
ant's conviction as a violation not of the right to present witnesses
but, rather, of the right to counsel. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan said simply that the state "could not .. . deny [the defend
ant] the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his [un
swom] statement."40
Considered in retrospect, this seemingly odd choice of paths
stems ·from the state of constitutional law at the time that the Court
decided

Ferguson.

In the early 1960s, the Court was in the midst of

its now-famous enterprise of incorporation, which ultimately would
apply virtually all of the protections in the Bill of Rights to the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
At the time that

Ferguson

arose, however, the Court had yet to

deem the Compulsory Process Clause applicable to the states.2
4 It
thus is not surprising that defense counsel in

Ferguson litigated

the

for either side. Such a view would, however, elevate form over substance. In any criminal
trial - that is, any time that the defendant does not admit to the crime but, instead, is
contesting some aspect thereof - it is the defense alone that would want to call the defend
ant as a witness. The prosecution, of course, could not compel the defendant to testify
against herself. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. And the prosecution hardly would want to call
the defendant to testify for herself. The crux of the Georgia disqualification rule, then, is to
disadvantage peculiarly the defense.

38. See 365 U.S. at 571.
39. 365 U.S. at 590. Georgia law provided that the defendant's unswom statement" 'shall
have such force only as thejury may think right to give it."' 365 U.S. at 571 (quoting disqual
ification statute).

40. 365 U.S. at 596.
41. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SuLLIVAN, CONSTITUTI ONAL LAW 441 {13th
ed. 1997).
42. A holding squarely on this point did not come until six years later. See Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 {1967). The Court did not deploy the incorporation doctrine to
make applicable to the states the related Sixth Amendment right of confrontation until 1965.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 {1965).
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case simply as a violation of the right to counsel,43 that right having
been incorporated by the Court in capital cases nearly three de
cades earlier.44
The recognition that Ferguson would signal the welcome demise
of the Georgia disqualification statute as a practical matter was not
lost upon the Justices. In their concurring opinions in Ferguson,
Justices Frankfurter and Clark, respectively, deemed it "meaning
less " and "not even intelligible " to address the lack of assistance
from counsel with respect to the defendant's unswom statement
without also explicitly invalidating the underlying disqualification
statute.4 5 Modem commentators have concurred in that assess
ment,4 6 as has the Court itself when referring to the result in

Ferguson

in the post-incorporation era.47

Though not cast in terms of a constitutional right to present wit
nesses,

Ferguson

nonetheless contains important intimations of

things to come. The Court devoted no less than ten pages of its
opinion to an extended account of the rise and fall of witness dis
qualification rules,48 including an explicit observation that a general
"[d]isqualification for interest was ... extensive in the common law
when this Nation was formed. "49 The Court's opinion, however,
contains no recognition that this history might have any significance
for the meaning of the Constitution. The upshot of the historical
record for the Court was simply that "decades ago the considered
consensus of the English-speaking world came to be that there was
for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the
accused. "50 The transition from a law of evidence with widespread,

no rational justification

generally applicable witness disqualification rules to one with few
such limitations thus was noteworthy only insofar as it undercut the
weightiness of the governmental interest behind the rule in ques43. In fact, the defendant "did not offer himself to be sworn as a witness," 365 U.S. at 572
n.1, such as would be necessary to raise the constitutionality of the Georgia disqualification
statute itself.
44. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); cf. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 571 (noting
that Ferguson "was under sentence of death").
45. 365 U.S. at 599 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 365 U.S. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring).
46. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 110-11 ("Ferguson was 'not a
right-to-counsel case.' The defendant was fully assisted by counsel in preparing his unswom
statement. .. . The essential defect from the defendant's viewpoint, rather, was that the state
ment was unswom, not that it was unassisted.'' (quoting 365 U.S. at 599 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))); see also Clinton, supra note 13, at 760.
47. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50 & n.7 (1987).
48. See 365 U.S. at 572-82.
49. 365 U.S. at 574.
50. 365 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added).
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tion. Although the Court noted the lack of evenhandedness in the
Georgia disqualification statute,51 that structural observation had
significance only as it served to accentuate the arbitrariness of the
state's position.
Six years later, in

Washington v. Texas,52 the

Court further con

flated notions of evenhandedness (focused upon the structure of
the rule in question) and notions of arbitrariness (focused upon the
weightiness of the interests behind the application of the rule in a
given case). With Washington, the right to present witnesses began
to take its present form. In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the
Court initially dispelled any doubts on the incorporation question
by holding explicitly that the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment applies to the states as a "fundamental element
of due process of law."53 In addition, the Court correctly reasoned
that the right to compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses
necessarily implies a right to admit witness testimony.s4
Turning to the merits, the Court again confronted a state evi
dence rule that discriminated between prosecution and defense. As
summarized by the Court, Texas statutes provided that "persons
charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime could not
testify for one another, although there was no bar to their testifying
for the State"55 - in essence, a one-way rule for criminal accom
plices. Like the Georgia disqualification rule in Ferguson, the Texas
rule for accomplices in

Washington was unique in the world of then

existing state evidence law.56 The Court struck down the Texas rule
as applied at trial to exclude the testimony of a witness offered by
the defense in a murder prosecution - a witness previously con
victed, apparently on an accomplice theory, in connection with the
same shooting.57 Defense counsel had sought to use the witness to
enhance the credibility of the defendant's own testimony - admit
ted at trial - to the effect that it was the witness himself, not the
defendant, who actually fired the shots that killed the victim.58
51. See 365 U.S. at 570.
52. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
53. See 388 U.S. at 19.
54. See 388 U.S. at 19, 23; see also supra section I.A (defending this inference).
55. 388 U.S. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
56. See 388 U.S. at 17 n.4 ("Counsel have cited no statutes from other jurisdictions, and
we have found none, that flatly disqualify coparticipants in a crime from testifying for each
other regardless of whether they are tried jointly or separately.").
57. See 388 U.S. at 16.
58. The prosecution's theory was that the defendant, joined by several other boys includ
ing Charles Fuller, initially threw bricks at the house where the victim lived. Most of the
boys then ran back to a nearby car, leaving only the defendant and Fuller in front of the
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Under the circumstances of the disputed shooting, the proffered
witness "was the only person other than [the defendant] who knew
exactly who had fired the shotgun and whether [the defendant] had
at the last minute attempted to prevent the shooting."59
The Court, however, did not strike down the application of the
Texas accomplice rule due to its lack of evenhandedness. Nor does
that refusal appear inadvertent; in fact, Justice Harlan wrote sepa
rately, concurring for himself alone, to say that it was the "discrimi
nation between the prosecution and the defense " that doomed the
rule.60 The Court instead reasoned that the defendant "was denied
his right to ...compulsory process ...because the State

arbitrarily

denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physi
cally and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had per
sonally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant
and material to the defense." 61 Again, the touchstone was arbitrar
iness, not the lack of evenhandedness in itself - although the
Court did regard the latter as an indication of the former.
The results in Ferguson and Washington make eminent sense,
and the approach that I sketch out later would not change them.62
Simply as a matter of enlightened evidence policy, the rules struck
down in the two cases are among the most bizarre to survive to
relatively recent times. In giving those rules a justly-deserved burhouse. To support a charge of murder, the prosecution contended that the defendant shot
and killed the victim when she rushed outside to investigate the commotion. See 388 U.S. at
15.
The trial judge permitted the defendant to testify that it was Fuller who fired the fatal
shot - indeed, that the defendant had sought to dissuade Fuller from shooting at all. The
defense then sought to call Fuller as a witness to support the credibility of the defendant's
testimony on these two factual points. Fuller, however, had previously been convicted in
connection with the same shooting - apparently as an accomplice. {Thus, under the prose
cution's theory of events, there was nothing inconsistent about seeking to convict the defend
ant for murder, based upon the premise that he had done the actual shooting.) Pointing to
the Texas prohibition upon the admission of accomplice testimony for the defense, the trial
judge excluded Fuller's testimony, and the defendant was convicted. See 388 U.S. at 16.
59. 388 U.S. at 16; see also 388 U.S. at 16 (characterizing accomplice's testimony as "vital"
to the defense).
60. See 388 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan based his view not upon
the Compulsory Process Clause - which he did not consider to be incorporated against the
states - but, instead, upon the Due Process Clause. See 388 U.S. at 24-25. I agree with
Justice Harlan's focus upon the lack of evenhandedness in the Texas rule, though I would
ground that focus specifically upon the Compulsory Process Clause, as incorporated against
the states per the Court in Washington.
61. 388 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). To this sentence, the Court appended a footnote to
indicate that "[n]othing in th[e] opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial
privileges ...which are based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the
common-law disqualifications for interest" or "nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as wit
nesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing events
or testifying about them." 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
62. See infra section III.A.
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ial, however, the Court left implications that would prove problem
atic. Peter Westen, a leading commentator on the right to present
witnesses, reads

Washington with understandable breadth.

Accord

ing to Westen:

by the use of the term "arbitrary" the Court was referring to the fact
that the Texas rule imposed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's
right to present witnesses because the rule wholly excluded evidence
that might have been reliable instead of permitting it to be heard,
weighed, and judged by the fact-finder.63
In effect, as Westen accurately observes, the Washington Court's
reasoning amounts to the application of a constitutional standard of
review much like the compelling interest test used for intrusions
upon other constitutional rights.64 Whatever the doctrinal label,
however, the Court put forward this approach not as one triggered
by the discriminatory structure of the Texas rule but, rather, as a
free-standing constitutional inquiry capable of extension to gener
ally applicable rules. As I now explain, the Court made precisely
this extension after

2.

Washington.
Generally Applicable Rules

Six years later, in

Chambers

v.

Mississippi, 65

the Court ad

dressed a Mississippi evidence rule different in structure from those
struck down as applied in

Ferguson

and

Washington.

Pursuant to

their common law powers, the Mississippi courts had permitted the
admission of out-of-court statements against interest as an excep
tion to the rule against hearsay, but the same courts had extended
this hearsay exception only to statements against the declarant's pe
cuniary interest. Statements against penal interest - that is, state
ments that tend to implicate the declarant in a crime - were
deemed outside the exception and, hence, inadmissible under the
rule against hearsay.66 Unlike the discriminatory rules in

Ferguson

63. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 200 (emphasis in original).
64. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 115 ("Without so stating, the
Court implied that the state had no 'compelling interest' in using disqualification as a means
for avoiding perjury.").
65. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In the years between Washington and Chambers, the Court de
cided one case on the right to present witnesses that did not implicate rules of evidence per
se. In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972), the Court reversed a criminal conviction on the
ground that the remarks of the trial judge had effectively denied the defendant the right to
present a witness. The witness in Webb the only one offered by the defense at trial - had
declined to testify "only after the (trial) judge's lengthy and intimidating warning" for the
witness to avoid perjury. See 409 U.S. at 97. The Court noted, in passing, that the judge had
"gratuitously singled out this one [defense] witness"; "none of the witnesses for the State had
been so admonished." 409 U.S. at 97, 96.
66. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299. I use the word "declarant" in the sense recognized in
evidence law: namely, to refer to the person who actually made the out-of-court statement in
-
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Chambers was

evenhanded on its face in the sense that it did not exempt out-of
court statements against penal interest, irrespective of whether the
offering party was the prosecution or the defense.67 In this respect,
the position of the Mississippi courts was hardly anomalous. To the
contrary, the Court acknowledged that "[t]his materialistic limita
tion on the declaration-against-interest hearsay exception appears
to be accepted by most States in their criminal trial processes. "68
The Court nonetheless struck down the Mississippi rule, as applied
at trial to exclude the testimony of defense witnesses. The defense
had offered the witnesses to recount three out-of-court statements
in which another man, Gable McDonald, had confessed to the
shooting of a police officer of which the defendant Chambers stood
accused.

Chambers,

in some respects, stands as the Court's broadest rec

ognition of a constitutional override to state restrictions on the
presentation of witnesses. The excluded witnesses were far from
the only avenue open to the defense to raise the possibility that the
prosecution had misidentified the defendant as the shooter.69
Rather, the defense wished to use the excluded witnesses to rein
force the credibility of other evidence already admitted. In particu
lar, the trial court had permitted the defense not only to call
McDonald himself as a witness, but also to read to the jury the tran
script of yet another out-of-court confession that McDonald had
question, as distinct from the witness who recounts that statement in the form of hearsay at
trial. See FED. R. Evm. 80l{b).
67. As discussed at greater length in section III.A, infra, I contend that the Mississippi
hearsay exception is not evenhanded where the declarant of the statement against penal in
terest also could be considered a coconspirator of the defendant. In that situation - one
different from the circumstances of Chambers itself - the prosecution would not need to
rely upon the hearsay exception for statements against interest in order to admit an out-of
court statement that would incriminate both the declarant and the defendant. The prosecu
tion, instead, may admit such evidence as a statement of a coconspirator of a party opponent.
68. 410 U.S. at 299.
69. Chambers arose from a confrontation between police officers and a hostile crowd at a
bar. The officers arrived at the scene with a warrant for the arrest of one man whom they, in
fact, located at the bar. When the officers attempted to make the arrest, however, members
of the crowd intervened. Several gunshots were fired at the officers from an alley; one struck
and ultimately killed Officer Sonny Liberty. Before he died, however, Officer Liberty man
aged to fire back into the alley. His first shot was wild and simply scattered the crowd stand
ing nearby. According to various witnesses, Officer Liberty "appeared . . . to take more
deliberate aim" before firing a second shot that struck but did not kill the defendant, Cham
bers. The prosecution charged the defendant with murder on the theory that Officer Liberty
had chosen to shoot back at the person who initially had fired upon him. As reinforcement
of this theory, the prosecution relied upon a surviving officer at the scene, who testified
specifically that he saw Chambers shoot Officer Liberty. See 410 U.S. at 285-86.
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made in the offices of defense counsel.7° Upon cross-examination
by the prosecution, however, McDonald repudiated that particular
confession. At that point, the trial court barred the defense from
using the disputed witnesses to inform the jury of the three addi
tional confessions by McDonald on the ground that those state
ments were not within the Mississippi hearsay exception for
statements against interest.71
Unable to point to any discrimination on the face of the Missis
sippi hearsay exception itself, the Court still struck down its appli
cation. The problem, said Justice Powell for the Court, was that:

The testimony rejected by the trial court . . . bore persuasive assur
ances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale
of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where con
stitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are impli
cated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat
the ends of justice.12
As one commentator tellingly observes, the Court's core holding
that "the defendant had a constitutional right to introduce evidence
deemed inadmissible under [generally applicable] state hearsay
rules was unprecedented. "73 Indeed, this holding comes as even
more of a surprise, given that the Court itself, several decades ear
lier in United States v. Donnelly, 74 had upheld the exclusion in fed

eral criminal trials of statements

against penal interest. In fact, the

Court had done so under circumstances wherein the disputed state70. See 410 U.S. at 291. The trial court also had permitted the defense to put on testi·
mony from two persons at the scene of the shooting: one testified that he actually "saw
McDonald shoot [the officer]," and the other "testified that he saw McDonald immediately
after the shooting with a pistol in his hand." 410 U.S. at 289.
71. See 410 U.S. at 291-92. Apart from its ruling on the admissibility of the three addi·
tional confessions, the trial court also barred the defense from recalling McDonald to the
stand on the ground that Mississippi law prohibited a party from impeaching its own witness
- a limitation known as the "voucher" rule. In a separate discussion, the Supreme Court
held that this too was constitutional error, though not under the right to present witnesses.
Noting that the state "ha[d) not sought to defend the [voucher] rule or explain its underlying
rationale," the Court struck down its application as a violation of the defendant's right "to
confront and to cross-examine those who give damaging testimony" against him - a right
that the Court considered applicable regardless of "whether the witness was initially put on
the stand by the [defense) or by the State." 410 U.S. at 297-98. On the relationship between
the right of confrontation and the right to present witnesses, see infra section Il.B.
72. 410 U.S. at 302. According to the Court, these "persuasive assurances of trustworthi
ness" were three: McDonald made each of the additional confessions "spontaneously to a
close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred." Each "was corroborated by some
other evidence" - namely, the evidence that the trial court had permitted the defense to
admit. And, finally, the additional confessions were "in a very real sense self-incriminatory
and unquestionably against interest." See 410 U.S. at 301.
73. Westen,

Compulsory Process I, supra

74. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).

note 13, at 152.
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ments appeared at least as reliable and as crucial to the defense as
those in Chambers.75 To avoid overruling Donnelly, the Court of
fered nothing more than a feeble distinction based upon the availa
bility of the declarant in Chambers to be examined by the defense
at trial.76 If anything, longstanding principles of evidence law hold
that the availability of the declarant is a fact that cuts

against the

admission of out-of-court statements against interest, not one that
supports a constitutional imperative to admit them.77
75. In Donnelly, the Court upheld a conviction for murder on an Indian reservation,
notwithstanding the district court's refusal to admit the testimony of a defense witness pre
pared to recount an out-of-court confession to the crime by another man, Joe Dick, who died
prior to trial. The Court recognized that the prosecution's own evidence "strongly tended to
exclude the theory that more than one person participated in the shooting" - the implica
tion being that "the Dick confession, if admi[tted], would have directly tended to exculpate
[the defendant]." 228 U.S. at 272. In fact, in its unsuccessful effort to build a foundation for
admission of the confession, the defense had pointed to a set of "human tracks upon a sand
bar at the scene of the crime [that] led in the direction of an acorn camp where Dick was
stopping at the time, rather than in the direction of the home of [the defendant]." 228 U.S. at
272. The defense also noted that "beside the track there was at one point an impression as of
a person sitting down" - a detail that defense counsel took to indicate "a stop caused by
shortness of breath, which would have been natural to Dick, who was shown to be a sufferer
from consumption." 228 U.S. at 272.
Unlike the situation in Chambers, the defense in Donnelly was unable to bring to the
attention of the jury in any other way the existence of an outright confession by a third
person. The net loss of exculpatory information thus was far greater in Donnelly than in
Chambers. The Donnelly Court nonetheless upheld the exclusion of hearsay testimony to
recount Dick's confession, relying exclusively upon the "practically unanimous weight of au
thority" at the time that regarded statements against penal interest as simply too unreliable
to be admitted. 228 U.S. at 273.
76. The Court stated that "[t]he availability of McDonald significantly distinguishe[d]"
the situation in Chambers "from the Donnelly-type situation," where "the declarant [Dick]
was unavailable at the time of trial" due to death. 410 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted).
77. It is a fundamental tenet of evidence law that the applicability of the hearsay excep
tion for statements against interest - whether or not understood to encompass statements
against penal interest - turns upon an initial determination that the declarant is unavailable
to testify at trial. See TAYLOR H. McELROY, MISSISSIPPI EVIDENCE § 46 (1955) (discussing
Mississippi hearsay exception for declarations of deceased against interest); see also 2
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1476, at 1834 (discussing common law basis for unavailability
requirement). The exception for statements against interest, in other words, is a rule that
prefers to admit hearsay when the alternative is to leave the jury unaware of the declarant's
statement, but not when the declarant is available to be called as a witness and thereby
confronted with his earlier remarks. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPAT
RICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 8.53, at 1327 (1995). As a result, the
unavailability of the declarant in Donnelly, if anything, is a fact that tends to help rather than
hinder an argument for admission of the Dick confession. To put the point the opposite way:
the availability of the declarant at the time of trial should be an additional reason - indeed,
a conclusive reason as far as the evidence rules are concerned - to keep out hearsay testi
mony from other persons about the declarant's remarks, not a source of support for a consti
tutional command to let it in.
The one factual detail that might salvage the outcome in Chambers specifically is that the
trial court there not only had deemed the disputed witness testimony to be inadmissible hear
say, but also had prevented the defense from recalling McDonald to the stand in order to
impeach him with the three additional confessions. Cf. supra note 71 (explaining that the
Chambers Court struck down this "voucher" rule in a separate portion of its opinion, based
not upon the right to present witnesses, but upon the right of confrontation). But that is an
anomaly attributable to the peculiar confluence of the Mississippi hearsay exception and the
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an extensive scholarly treatment of the Chambers litigation,
defense counsel understood the Court to recognize that "the ac
cused in a criminal proceeding ha� a constitutional right to intro
duce any exculpatory evidence, unless the state can demonstrate
that it is so inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no
rational basis for evaluating its truth. "78 The Court's analysis cer
tainly marks the decoupling of a free-standing judicial standard of
arbitrariness from any structural notions of evenhandedness.
Even the Chambers Court itself, however, was not entirely at
ease with this move; rather, the Court sprinkled its opinion with
hedges and caveats to suggest that its arbitrariness standard might
not be all that it seemed. Upon noting emphatically that "[f]ew
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present wit
nesses in his own defense," the Court immediately added that, "[i]n
the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State,
must comply with established rules of : . . evidence designed to as
sure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence."79 Later, in a passage bordering upon the disingenuous,
the Court announced its conclusion on the merits but quickly added
that, "[i]n reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of
constitutional law" nor otherwise "signal any diminution in the re
spect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. "80
The Court's apparent concern to cabin the reach of its reasoning
in Chambers extends, most obviously, to future cases. Specifically,
the hedging in Chambers stands as an attempt to avoid "the flood
gates problem," on which I elaborate later in this Part.81 As one
commentator has observed, some lower courts in the years after
Chambers drew upon the Supreme Court's equivocal dicta to slow
the application of the right to present witnesses.82
In

stat e's s eparat e pro hibitio n upo n the impeachment o f wit ness es by the party who calls t hem
at t rial. It is not a po int of distinctio n t hat o ne may generalize, much less co nstitutio nalize, as
the Chambers Co urt att empted to do in o rder to avo id the o verruling o f Donnelly.

78. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra not e 13, at 151-52 (emphas is in o riginal). See
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 285 (identifyin g Westen as co uns el fo r the defendant before the

Supreme Court).

79. 410

U.S. at

302.

80. 410

U.S. at

302-03.

81. See infra s ect io n I.C.2 .
82. See St even G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of
Chambers v. M ississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 131, 137-38 (1983) (des cribing reactio n o f lo wer
co urts as " ambivalent" and " clearly mixed" ).
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After Chambers, the Court itself left the right essentially un
touched for two decades,83 until 1987, when it began to apply it in
the context of generally applicable restrictions upon newly emerg
ing forms of witness testimony. In

Rock

v.

Arkansas, 84

the Court

struck down a per se prohibition upon the admission of
hypnotically-enhanced testimony, as applied at trial to prevent a
criminal defendant herself from testifying about the circumstances
of a homicide. The dispute in Rock centered upon the events that
led to the shooting death of the defendant's husband. Interviewed
by the police at the scene, the defendant stated that the shooting
occurred in the course of a scuffle, after her husband had severely
battered her; but the defendant "could not remember the precise
details of the shooting."85 After undergoing two hypnosis sessions
at the suggestion of her attorney, the defendant recalled that she
had not held her finger on the trigger of the gun; instead, she said,
"the gun had discharged [accidentally] when her husband grabbed
her

arm

during the scuffie."86 In a trial for manslaughter, the prose

cution objected to the admission of this testimony from the defend
ant as the product of hypnotic enhancement.
As in Chambers, the disputed testimony in Rock was not the
only means open to the defense to present its version of the facts here, to raise the possibility that the defendant did not cause the
gun to discharge. Prompted by the details newly recalled by the
defendant, her attorney arranged for a handgun expert to examine
the particular weapon in the case, and the trial court ultimately per
mitted the expert to testify "that the gun was defective and prone to
fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger's being pulled."87 The
trial court ruled, however, that the defendant herself could not tes
tify about her post-hypnotic recollections of the shooting, and the
jury returned a conviction for manslaughter.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, using its
common law authority to deem hypnotically-enhanced testimony
83. During this period, the Court applied its analysis in Chambers to vacate a death sen
tence where the trial court, in the sentencing phase, had excluded as inadmissible hearsay
under state evidence law a statement against penal interest offered by the defense. See
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979). Tue Court also overturned a conviction where
the trial court had excluded testimony bearing upon the voluntariness of a confession by the
defendant. Tue trial court's ruling violated earlier Court precedents allocating to the jury the
ultimate determination of whether a given confession is voluntary. See Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1986).
84. 483

U.S. 44 (1987).
U.S. at 46.
483 U.S. at 47.
483 U.S. at 47.

85. 483
86.
87.
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not a case in which the state

sought to apply a per se ban formulated long ago, in factually dis
similar circumstances. Arkansas's stance was far from anomalous
amongst the states to have considered hypnotically-enhanced testi
mony. A few states had deemed such evidence generally admissi
ble, and a few others were willing to admit it upon the use of certain
safeguards; but a plurality of jurisdictions had found hypnotically
enhanced testimony to be "so unreliable" as to be categorically
inadmissible in criminal trials,89 though the cases did not specifically
involve testimony from the defendant.90 Sifting through these dif
ferent perspectives, the Arkansas court credited the view of the
leading law review article on the subject at the time, written by a
prominent clinical psychiatrist, who pointedly stated that '"[a]fter
hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate between a true recollec
tion and a fantasy or a suggested detail' " and that even experts in
hypnosis could not discern the difference upon observation of the
subject.91 The court went on to note that the safeguards identified
by some other states did "not even address[ ] " the prospect that the
subject might "confus[e] actual recall with confabulation" or might
gain "unwarranted

confidence in the validity of his ensuing

recollection. "92
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Writing for
the Court, Justice Blackmun started with the unassailable observa
tion that the right to present witnesses is "incomplete
fendant] may not present himself as a witness."93

if

[the de

The Court

professed no desire to opine about "the admissibility of testimony
of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defend
ants. "94 But the Court nonetheless invoked its earlier decisions on
the presentation of third-party witnesses to say that, "fj]ust as a
88. See Rock v. State, 708 S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1986).
89. See 708 S.W.2d at 79 (citing earlier decisions from Arizona, California, Massachusetts,
Maryland, and New York flatly barring hypnotically-enhanced testimony).
90. See 483 U.S. at 57 ("States that have adopted an exclusionary rule . . . have done so
for the testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant." (emphasis in original)).
Cf. infra section I.C.1.b (contending that there is no principled distinction, for constitutional
purposes, between a criminal defendant's right to testify herself and her right to present
third-party witnesses).
91. See 708 S.W.2d at 80 (quoting Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of
Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313, 314 (1980)).
92. 708 S.W.2d at 82-83 n.2.
93. 483 U.S. at 52. In addition to treating the testimony of the defendant herself in Rock
as an aspect of the right to present witnesses, the Court also noted that a defendant's prerog
ative to testify is "a necessary corollary" to the defendant's Filth Amendment right to refuse
to testify. 483 U.S. at 52.
94. See 483 U.S. at 58 n.15.
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State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a
material defense witness from taking the stand, it also may not ap
ply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but
arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony."95 Here
again, per Chambers, is the inquiry for arbitrariness divorced from
the examination of structure.
The Court readily characterized hypnotic enhancement as "con
troversial," adding that experts had developed "no generally ac
cepted theory to explain the phenomenon" of hypnosis itself and
that "the current medical and legal view of its appropriate role is
unsettled. "96 Indeed, the Court added that "scientific understand
ing of the phenomenon and of the means to control the effects of
hypnosis is still in its infancy."97

Rock thus does not tum so much

upon specific findings about the state of scientific knowledge about
hypnosis - a slippery ground upon which to base constitutional
analysis, in any event - but, more deeply, upon the apparent rigor
of the Court's legal standard that limitations upon the right to pres
ent witnesses "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the pur
poses they are designed to serve. "98
The Rock opinion contains rhetoric that would lead one to think
that this "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard is especially
tough stuff, approximating the strict scrutiny that the Court regu
larly deploys in other areas involving intrusions upon constitutional
rights. The Court stated emphatically that "[w]holesale inadmissi
bility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the
right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudi
ating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections."99 In explaining
why the Arkansas per se rule did not satisfy this test, the Court
stated that at least some of the risks associated with hypnotically
enhanced testimony "can be reduced, although perhaps not elimi
nated, by the use of procedural safeguards" in the hypnosis process
itself1°0 - an observation akin to a statement that the state had
available less restrictive means by which to advance at least some of
its objectives.
As an institutional matter, the application of such a demanding
standard of review - even to a rule barring both prosecution and
95. 483 U.S. at 55.
96. 483 U.S. at 59.
97. 483 U.S. at 61.
98. See 483 U.S. at 56.
99. 483 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added).
100. 483 U.S. at 60.
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defense alike from using a hotly-disputed type of witness testimony
- reveals a profound level of distrust for the rulemaker. In fact,
the four dissenting Justices in Rock focused primarily upon notions
of institutional competency, arguing that deference to common law
policymaking by state courts in the field of evidence should be "at
its highest . . . where, as the Court concedes, 'scientific understand
ing . . . is still in its infancy. ' "101 Even the dissenters in Rock, how
ever, did not confront head-on the majority's fundamental
conception of the right to present witnesses as an entitlement to
exceptions.
Given the case law from Ferguson to Rock, one might have
thought that the Court, in its most recent Term, would have had
very little trouble striking down a per se prohibition upon the ad
mission of expert scientific testimony concerning the results of poly
graph examinations102 - particularly as applied to an examination
of the defendant himself in a proceeding that turned upon the cred
ibility of his testimony. This, however, did not happen. That a lop
sided majority of not less than eight Justices would uphold precisely
such a rule in United States v. Scheffer103 is strong evidence that
something important is afoot for the right to present witnesses. As
such, it is worthwhile to parse closely the Court's most recent expo
sition of the right.
C.

The Arbitrariness of an "Arbitrary or
Disproportionate" Standard

In Part Ill, I ultimately conclude that the result in Scheffer is
right as a matter of first principles. For present purposes, however,
I take the Court on its own terms in order to ask whether it is possi
ble to maintain the existing "arbitrary or disproportionate " stan
dard, perhaps with a few caveats, exceptions, or minor repairs. I
conclude that it is not.
As I explain here, the Court's constitutional reasoning in Schef
fer is indefensible, either as a matter of precedent or in terms of the
101. 483 U.S. at 65 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 483 U.S. at 61).
102. Tue co=on form of polygraph test measures a variety of physiological responses
to a set of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these physiological
correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury about whether the witness often, as in this case, the accused - was deceptive in answering the questions about the
very matters at issue in the trial.
United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1267 (1998).
103. 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998). For an early and largely critical assessment of Scheffer, di
rected to its likely effect upon the admissibility of polygraph evidence in particular, see Lloyd
C. Peeples, III et al., Exculpatory Polygraphs in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set
You Free, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 77 (1998).
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three substantive propositions that the Court sought to draw there
from. It would be one thing if an observer could dismiss the analyt

ical flaws of

Scheffer

as anomalous. Justice Thomas's opinion for

the Court, however, raises more fundamental doubts about the via
bility of the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard.
best understand

One may

Scheffer as the product of a deep and well-founded

concern on the part of the Court over the potential of such a stan
dard

-

if applied in the manner of earlier cases - to necessitate

a

radical rethinking of many settled principles of evidence law. The

Scheffer Court, however,

did the law a disservice by attempting to

give wing to those legitimate concerns within its current analytical
framework rather than by taking a fresh look at that framework
itself. In fairness to the Court, one should note that counsel did not
litigate the case as a vehicle for such a rethinking of the right to
present witnesses. 104 My goal is to initiate that debate.

1.

The Court on Its Own Terms

The circumstances in

Scheffer would

seem virtually to invite a

replay for polygraph evidence of the debate in
Although the dispute in
court martial, the Court

Rock over hypnosis.
Scheffer arose in the context of a military
effectively treated the case as if it had in

volved the presentation of witnesses in an ordinary criminal trial.ms
As such, the practical consequence of the Court's decision has been
to uphold the constitutional permissibility of per se prohibitions
upon polygraph evidence in some twenty-seven states. 106
There are other parallels as well: the defense in

Scheffer sought

to use the disputed expert testimony concerning the defendant's
polygraph examination to lend credibility to the defendant's own
104. The Solicitor General, for example, did not call upon the Court to overrule Rock,
much less to understand the right to present witnesses generally as a right of equal treatment
See Brief for United States, Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998) (No. 96-1133), available at
LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 1133. By contrast, the absence of briefing on whether to make a
fundamental switch from an exception-based to an equality-based understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause did not stop the Court from doing just that in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1113-14 (criticizing the Court for not
requesting additional briefing on this question before rendering decision).
105. The Court, for instance, did not decide the case based upon some notion of special
presidential authority with regard to the making of evidence rules for the military context.
For the sake of clarity, I shall use the terminology of criminal trials - prosecution, defend
ant, etc. - when describing the circumstances in Scheffer.
106. See Peeples et al, supra note 103, at 96 n.135 (citing state decisions). Although there
is no prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically directed to polygraph evi
dence, some federal circuits have excluded such evidence per se upon application of the gen
eral framework for expert scientific testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d
192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming its preexisting ban after reconsideration in light of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
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testimony at his court-martial. Based upon the results of a urinal
ysis that the defendant Scheffer voluntarily had undergone while
working for the Air Force as an informant in drug investigations,
the Air Force had charged him with use of methamphetamines.107
At his court martial, Scheffer denied that he knowingly had in
gested the drug and testified in such a manner as to suggest that a
suspected dealer may have surreptitiously drugged him in the
course of an undercover operation.108
To lend credibility to this account, defense counsel sought to in
form the jury that - before the results of the urinalysis were
known and as part of routine Air Force procedure for its drug infor
mants - Scheffer voluntarily had taken a government-adminis
tered polygraph examination. "In the opinion of the examiner, the
test 'indicated no deception' when [Scheffer] denied using drugs
since joining the [military]."109 The court martial excluded the ex
pert's testimony pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 707, which
flatly bars the admission of polygraph evidence.110 As in Rock,
then, the testimony at issue in Scheffer lay at the heart of an ongo
ing scientific controversy.111 Military Rule 707 itself is not an
archaic holdover from the earliest stages of that debate; rather, the
President issued it in 1991, in response to a military court decision
that purported to open the door to polygraph evidence for both

107. Periodic urinalysis, not surprisingly, is part of the standard procedures for infor
mants in drug investigations under the auspices of the Air Force Office of Special Investiga
tions. See 118 S. Ct. at 1263.
108. See 118 S. Ct. at 1261. Scheffer recalled that he had visited the house of a suspected
drug dealer and, thereafter, had begun driving back to the Air Force base. "The next thing
he remembered was waking up the next morning in his car in a remote area, not knowing
how he got there." United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.M.A. 1996). This is not to
say that Scheffer necessarily is a case of factual innocence. Had Scheffer, in fact, blacked out
shortly after his contact with the suspected drug dealer, his flat denial of drug usage just three
days later during his polygraph examination would seem quite odd. One would think that he
would have had every reason at least to mention his blackout at that juncture. In addition,
the other charges of which Scheffer was convicted - passing 17 bad checks and being absent
without leave from his military post for 13 days, see 118 S. Ct. at 1263 - are at least consis
tent with the behavior of a person with a drug problem. In short, the notion that some
subjects may be able to "fool" a polygraph is not merely a theoretical concern on the facts of
Scheffer, though the Court treated it as such. See 118 S. Ct. at 1265 n.6.
109. 118 S. Ct. at 1263.
110. In pertinent part, this rule provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the
opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or
taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence.

Mn..

R. EVID. 707(a).

111. See infra section I.C.1.a (discussing the Court's reliance upon the lack of scientific
consensus as the central justification for the upholding of Military Rule 707).
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sides in courts martial, at least under some circumstances.112 One
easily can imagine the same sort of response from a state legisla
ture, or indeed from Congress, with regard to controversial new
types of witness testimony that may arise in the years ahead.

In light of what came before, the reasoning used by the Court to
uphold the per se prohibition upon polygraph evidence in

Scheffer

is full of surprises. Specifically, the Court rested its holding upon
three central propositions that warrant close attention,113 not only
to ascertain the correctness of Scheffer itself, but also, more signifi
cantly, as possible constitutional principles by which to cabin an
exception-based view of the right to present witnesses. Wholesale
reconception of the right would not be necessary

if it were possible

to take an exception-based view without thereby calling into doubt
a vast array of familiar evidence principles.
The first proposition appears in the Court's account of the justi
fications behind the per se rule. Here, the Court identifies what it
considers the crucial rationale for the permissibility of a per se rule:
"There is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.
To this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized
about the reliability of polygraph techniques. "114 In the face of this
112. See Exec. Order No. 12,767, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,284 (1991) (responding to United States
v. Gipson, 24 MJ. 246 (C.M.A. 1987)).
113. I focus here upon those propositions with which the eight-member majority of the
Court agreed: namely, those stated in Parts II-A and II-D of Justice Thomas's opinion for
the Court. In Parts 11-B and 11-C, Justice Thomas set forth two additional reasons for the
upholding of the per se ban on polygraph evidence - concern over interference with jury
functions and over collateral litigation - but only a plurality of Justices agreed. See 118 S.
Ct. at 1269-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)
(considering it unnecessary to reach these two additional grounds for the rule and, in any
event, disagreeing with Justice Thomas's analysis of jury functions).
114. 118 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing treatises on scientific evidence); see also 118 S. Ct. at 1269
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and
courts on the subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a per se exclu
sion of polygraph results.").
Given the ongoing rancor about the polygraph, it is worthwhile to take special care to
identify the precise source of uncertainty here. The Court readily acknowledged the defend
ant's observation that "current research shows polygraph testing is reliable more than 90
percent of the time." 118 S. Ct. at 1265 n.6. Similarly, Justice Stevens pointed out, in dissent,
that "[t]here are a host of studies that place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85% to 90%."
118 S. Ct. at 1276 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although the point is not articulated clearly in the Court's opinion, the lingering sense of
uncertainty troubling the Court appears to center not upon aggregate estimates of reliability
based upon experimental research but, instead, upon the more difficult question of whether
one can ascertain the reliability of polygraph evidence in a particular instance. This seems to
be what the Court is getting at when it states that, "[a]lthough the degree of reliability of
polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way
to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate . . . ." 118
S. Ct. at 1266 (emphasis added). Likewise, immediately after acknowledging the defendant's
aggregate estimate of reliability, the Court hastened to add that, "[e]ven if the basic debate
about the reliability of polygraph technology itself were resolved, . . . there would still be

1092

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1063

uncertainty, the Court could not say that a per se prohibition was
"arbitrary."
The second and third propositions come later in the opinion,
where the Court seeks to distinguish its holding from those in ear
lier cases - all of which held in favor of the defendant asserting the
right to present witnesses. The Court sought to distinguish Rock on
the ground that the trial court there had applied a per se rule
against hypnotically-enhanced testimony so as "to infringe[ ] upon
the accused's interest in testifying in her own defense."115 In addi
tion to this proffered distinction between testimony by the defend
ant herself and testimony of other defense witnesses, the Court
went on to suggest that the expert testimony excluded in Scheffer
did not present the jury with additional firsthand information con
cerning the events in question.116 Rather, the court martial "heard
all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective
of the accused" - namely, through Scheffer's own testimony.111
The ban on polygraph evidence "merely" prevented Scheffer from
introducing the polygraph examiner, in essence, as a form of cumu
lative evidence - merely to "bolster" the credibility of the testi
mony that Scheffer himself already had given.118 The Court then
declared that the per se prohibition upon polygraph evidence did
"not implicate any significant interest of the accused"119 - a statecontroversy over the efficacy of countermeasures, or deliberately adopted strategies that a
polygraph examinee can employ to provoke physiological responses that will obscure accu
rate readings and thus 'fool' the polygraph machine and the examiner." 118 S. Ct. at 1265
n.6.; cf. supra note 108 (noting reasons to suspect that Scheffer might have "fool[ed]" the
polygraph in this instance). It does one little good to know that polygraphs are reliable "90
percent of the time," in other words, if one cannot reliably ascertain whether the particular
polygraph evidence in the case at hand falls in the 90 percent that are reliable or the 10
percent that are not. The Court thus does not seem to be insisting that polygraphs must be
100 percent accurate. Instead, the Court's concern seems to focus upon a perceived lack of
extrinsic means - i.e., aside from the polygraph itself - by which to distinguish accurate
from inaccurate polygraph results in particular instances.
The Scheffer Court might have added a related point that data generated from experimen
tal settings in which the underlying truth is known (and the experimenter simply wishes to
determine how often the examiner, aided by the polygraph, can detect that the subject is
lying) plainly is not the same enterprise as the selection of appropriate rules for a trial setting
where, by definition, the truth is not known (and the process of witness testimony is itself the
major vehicle for reconstructing the truth).
115. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268.
116. In the course of distinguishing Rock, for example, the Court emphasized that the
exclusion of the disputed witness in that case "deprived the jury of the testimony of the only
witness who was at the scene and had firsthand knowledge of the facts." 118 S. Ct. at 1268.
117. See 118 S.

Ct.

at 1268.

118. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69.
119. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268.
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ment that comes as a shock after the Court's earlier description of
the right to present witnesses as a "fundamental" right.120
As explained in the subsections that follow, all three of the pro
positions underlying Scheffer are seriously flawed and, in particular,
do not form plausible constitutional limits upon an exception-based
view of the right to present witnesses.121

a. Uncertainty as Justification.

The claim that uncertainty is suf

ficient to support the application of a categorical, per se rule is pro
foundly at odds with the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard
set forth earlier by the Court and reiterated by the Scheffer major
ity.122 In Rock, the Court struck down the application of the Ar
kansas per s e ban on hypnotically-enhanced testimony,
notwithstanding the Court's own explicit acknowledgment that the
reliability of that testimony was uncertain.123 In Chambers, too,
there was divergence amongst the states over the appropriate treat
ment of statements against penal interest.124
Apart from precedent, the question of whether uncertainty
should justify application of general evidence rules to restrict de
fense testimony ultimately is a debate over the underlying standard
of constitutional review.

If the "arbitrary or disproportionate"

standard really does amount to some form of heightened constitu
tional scrutiny, then

Rock

surely is correct that uncertainty alone

should not be sufficient to support a per se rule of inadmissibility.
If, however, the standard actually is something more closely ap
proximating ordinary rationality review, then uncertainty would be
a sufficient justification. One conceivable reading of Scheffer, then,
would see the case as an effort by the Court to water down, sub
silentio, the underlying standard of constitutional review. The prob
lem is that Scheffer, so understood, does its watering indiscrimi120. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also 118 S. Ct. at 1272 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's opinion barely acknowledges that a person accused of a crime has a
constitutional right to present a defense.").
121. The Scheffer Court alluded to the correct constitutional principle virtually by acci
dent, mentioning in a fleeting footnote that the rule struck down in Washington v. Texas
"burdened only the defense and not the prosecution." 118 S. Ct. at 1268 n.12.
122. See 118 S. Ct. at 1264.
123. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; see also lMwJNKE LRIED & GARLAND,
supra note 14, § 2-4, at 51 (noting that the reliability of hypnotically-enhanced testimony like
that in Rock "was and still is highly debatable"); cf. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra
note 13, at 203 (reading the pre-Rock case law as establishing that "the defendant has a
constitutional right to produce any witness whose ability to give reliable evidence is some
thing about which reasonable people can differ" (emphasis omitted)); id. at 207 (stating simi
lar standard).
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text
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nately, shedding doubt upon the rigor of constitutional review even
for rules that are not evenhanded.
For its part, the

Scheffer Court itself did not say explicitly that it

was seeking to make any change in the underlying standard of re
view. The Court, instead, sought to limit its earlier cases by way of
distinction. But, as I now explain, neither of the Court's distinc
tions are plausible as a matter of precedent or sound constitutional
principle.
the

b. The Defendant as Witness. In an effort to distinguish Rock,
Scheffer Court suggested that the right to present witnesses car

ries greater constitutional weight when the proffered witness con
sists of the defendant herself, as distinct from a third-party witness.
This proposition is decidedly out of step with the Court's previous
opinions in the area, which strongly suggest that there is no distinc
tion, from a constitutional standpoint, between situations in which
exculpatory evidence comes from the defendant's own recollection
or from the memory of a third party.
As a textual matter, "the compulsory process clause draws no
distinction between the defendant and other 'witnesses in his
favor.' " 125 Moreover, as a doctrinal matter, there is no basis to
draw such a distinction when the Court already has deemed the
right to present third-party witnesses to be among the "fundamen
tal" aspects of a criminal trial.126 In the Court's current constitu
tional lexicon, there is no category of "super-fundamental" rights.
In Rock, the Court did note that it was faced with a situation in
which the defendant herself wished to testify; and, in a footnote, the

Rock

Court eschewed any desire to speak specifically to "the ad

missibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other
than criminal defendants." 127 Rhetoric aside, however, the logic of

Rock is not so confined.

To the contrary, the

Rock Court intermin

gled its discussion of the defendant's right to testify with an exposi
tion of the general right to present witnesses;12s and commentators
125.
126.

Westen,

Compulsory Process I, supra

note

13,

at

119.

By declaring, in Chambers, that "[fjew rights are more fundamental than that of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense," the Court clearly spoke of third-party wit
nesses. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (pre-Scheffer case, reiterating the "fundamental" nature of the right to
present witnesses and adding that it is "an essential attribute of the adversary system itself''
in the course of holding that trial courts nonetheless may sanction defendants for violations
of discovery rules concerning the pretrial disclosure of witnesses).

127. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 n.15 (1987).
128. See 483 U.S. at 51-52. Moreover, to acknowledge, as Rock does, that the right of the
defendant herself to testify finds additional support as "a necessary corollary to the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony" is not to draw any distinction as to
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Scheffer properly had understood the reasoning in Rock to

extend to witnesses other than the defendant herself.129
Precedent aside, the

pre-Scheffer case law is right as a matter of

first principles in its refusal to distinguish between the defendant's
own testimony and that of a third-party witness. H the right to pre
sent witnesses really does consist of an entitlement to exceptions
from generally applicable evidence rules as necessary to bring to
the jury's attention exculpatory testimony, then it makes no sense
to draw such a distinction. Whether exculpatory testimony comes
from the defendant herself or from a third party is likely to depend
upon little more than pure chance: for example, whether a third
party happened to be at the scene of the crime at the relevant time.
Indeed, a distinction between testimony by defendants and testi
mony by third parties would tend, as a practical matter, to make the
right to present witnesses depend upon the particular criminal ele
ment in dispute in a given case. The major issue in

Rock

turned

upon causation: whether the defendant's actions had caused the
gun to discharge.13o A defendant will be in a position to testify in a
case focused upon causation

(if she can remember what happened),

and the same is likely to be true in a case that centers upon the
defendant's mental state at the time of the criminal act. By con
trast, a defendant may not be in a position to provide the crucial
testimony when her defense centers upon misidentification. Here,
the whole point of the defense is that the defendant did not commit
the crime. In such a scenario, the viability of a misidentification
defense is likely to turn not simply upon the defendant's own disa
vowal of the crime but, more crucially, upon the testimony of some
third person: someone thought by the defense to be the actual per
petrator or, one step removed, someone who heard inculpatory re
marks made by such a person, as in

Chambers.

Whatever one's

conception of the right to present witnesses, its content surely
should not turn upon fortuities or upon the particular criminal ele
ments in dispute in a given case.
One might well expect the jury, as a general matter, to discount
more readily the testimony of a defendant on grounds of self
interest than the jury might discount the account of a third party
constitutional weight. See 483 U.S. at 52. Support in two places in the text, rather than just
one, does not somehow double the protection to which the Constitution entitles the
defendant.
129. See IMwINKELRIEo & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 6-4, at 163 {"Although the Rock
opinion does not explicitly resolve the issue, most commentators have concluded that Rock
will ultimately be extended to defense witnesses other than the accused.").
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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with no stake in the case. That observation, however, would be an
odd justification for placing greater constitutional weight upon the
right of the defendant herself to testify. If anything, the greater
willingness of the jury to find credible the testimony given by a dis
interested third party - in particular, the prospect that such testi
mony may be more likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of
the jury - should,

if

anything, make it more compelling for the

defense to admit the testimony of such a person under an
exception-based view, as compared to the potentially self-serving
testimony of the defendant. But that is not the law, at least after

Scheffer.131
c. Firsthand Knowledge. The third proposition relied upon by
the Scheffer Court fares no better. By definition, a polygraph ex
amination that indicates a lack of deception serves merely to sug
gest that the testimony of the test subject at trial is worthy of belief.
In this sense, the Court is literally correct to say that expert testi
mony concerning a polygraph examination.does not itself add to the

''firsthand

knowledge" conveyed to the jury about the disputed

events in the case but, instead, serves simply to "bolster" the credi
bility of what the test subject already has recounted directly in
court.132
This observation, however, is an implausible reed upon which to
rest the application of a "fundamental" constitutional right. The
Court's distinction draws far too fine a line between "firsthand
knowledge" that merely makes more believable what a previous
witness has said and information gleaned in other ways that may
have even greater force, precisely because it makes more coherent

131. One of the ironies of Scheffer is that the excluded defense expert witness was not
merely a disinterested third party but actually an agent of the prosecuting government itself.
Cf. United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1278 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is
incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures,
and the questions asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's burden of prov·
ing that the test was properly conducted.").
132. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69 (emphasis added). The strategic value of polygraph evi
dence for the defense in a criminal case consists of its implications for the veracity of a test
subject who serves as a witness, not in the ability of the examiner simply to testify - wholly
apart from the polygraph - that the subject made a prior statement concerning the facts of
the case. Thus, in Scheffer, the whole point of admitting the polygraph evidence was to sup
port Scheffer's veracity, not to convey simply that Scheffer had made some prior statement to
the government denying that he had used drugs. The terms of Military Rule 707 would seem
to leave a defendant like Scheffer entirely free to testify himself about his making of such a
prior statement in an effort to persuade the jury that he has been telling the same story all
along. The defendant simply could not add that the statement was made in the course of a
polygraph examination or that the examination indicated a lack of deception in the
statement.
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and credible what the jury already has heard.133 If anything,
Chambers is precisely such a case. There, the disputed witnesses
had no "firsthand knowledge" in the sense of personal observations
made at the scene of the shooting in dispute. Insofar as they had
any knowledge at all that bore upon disputed matters, it consisted
of knowledge in a form that the law of evidence, at least presump
tively, disfavors: namely, hearsay - albeit, hearsay purporting to
consist of confessions by another man to the shooting.134 Indeed, as
emphasized earlier, the trial court in Chambers already had permit
ted the jury to hear other testimony - including from the pur
ported shooter himself - that raised, with some plausibility, the
prospect of misidentification.135

Chambers,

in short, is a case of

witnesses with only secondhand knowledge, offered simply to bol
ster the credibility of other misidentification evidence admitted at
trial. The Chambers Court nonetheless deemed the admission of
those witnesses to be constitutionally required. It thus comes as no
surprise that modem commentators plausibly have read

Chambers

as recognizing a constitutional right to present additional exculpa
tory witnesses, "even when other witnesses have testified to the
same facts,

if

the jury could reasonably conclude that [the addi

tional witnesses'] testimony is more credible, or that the mere
cumulation of testimony adds to its weight."136
The

Scheffer

Court offered no principled answer to

ac

Chambers,

stating merely that it had sought to "confine[ ] its [earlier] holding
to the 'facts and circumstances' presented" and asserting flatly that

Chambers

"does not stand for the proposition that the accused is

denied a fair opportunity to defend himself whenever a state or fed133. Writing outside the context of constitutional rights just one Term prior to Scheffer,
the Supreme Court underscored the importance of permitting the prosecution to admit evi
dence of a criminal defendant's prior bad acts
within the parameters of Rule 404 - as a
way to enhance the narrative coherence of other evidence already introduced to prove the
specific criminal conduct alleged of the defendant in the case at hand. See Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653 (1997) ("Evidence . . . has force beyond any linear scheme
of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power not
only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the [further] infer
ences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict."). For a more extensive
exposition of my views on Old Chief and its relationship to the cognitive psychological litera
ture on jury decisionmaking, see Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminal
ization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121, 1168-71 (1998).
134. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
136. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 225-26 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted); see also Clinton, supra note 13, at 791-92 (observing that Chambers "clearly did
break new constitutional ground" as "the first case in which the right to defend has been
applied to arguably cumulative, albeit critical, defense testimony"); IMwINKE LRIED &
GARLAND, supra note 14, § 2-4, at 45 ("In Chambers, the hearsay evidence was technically
cumulative." (footnote omitted)).
-
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era! rule excludes favorable evidence."137 These are exceedingly
weak grounds of distinction. Again,

if the point of the

Constitution

really is to entitle defendants to exceptions from generally applica
ble rules in order to admit exculpatory evidence - at least when
that evidence appears "vital"138 or "critical"139 to the case at hand
- then the expression of a constitutional preference for firsthand
knowledge, or for testimony that

will

do something more than just

bolster other evidence, is itself arbitrary.
What could possibly be going on here? At the most superficial
level, one might seek to attribute the Court's troublesome reason
ing in Scheffer to nothing more than the changes in Court personnel
in the decade since Rock.140 Simple judicial head-counting does not
form a satisfying explanation, however, when one considers that the
eight-member majority in Scheffer bridged the usual fissures of judi
cial philosophy and interpretive methodology amongst the Justices.
Nor can one casually dismiss

Scheffer

as an inartful application of

the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard, brought on by some
anomalous visceral reaction against polygraphs specifically.
Rather, there is language in

Scheffer that is

strikingly

not new but

that brings to the fore the hedges and caveats lurking in earlier de
cisions, like

Scheffer,

Chambers itself.

As I next discuss, it is this feature of

more than its specific holding, that makes the case a pro

vocative harbinger for the future.

2. Exceptions and Floodgates
In contrast to
right to

Scheffer's forebears, the Court's description of the
present witnesses in Scheffer starts not with the venerable

constitutional roots of that right but, instead, with its limits and
qualifications. The Court states cryptically that the right "is not un
limited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions."141 This lan
guage is in keeping with the Court's prior statements, in otherwise
expansive opinions, to the effect that "[t]he accused does not have
an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privi137. 118 S. Ct. at 1268 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973)).
138. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
139. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, SS (1987) (reiter
ating that the witness testimony offered by Chambers was "critical to his defense").

140. Of the five Justices who voted to strike down the per se ban on hypnotically
enhanced testimony in Rock, only one - Justice Stevens - remains on the current Court,
and he was the lone dissenter in Scheffer. By contrast, three of the four dissenters in Rock Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia - subsequently voted to uphold
the per se rule in Scheffer. Compare Rock, 483 U.S. at 4S with Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1263.
141. 118 S.

Ct. at

1264.
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leged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evi
dence."142 Insofar as one may discern from the Court's cases as a
whole, however, the process of distinguishing permissible from im
permissible applications of evidence rules is largely an ad hoc
enterprise.143
The Court's repeated expressions of hesitancy are not a feature
unique to the cases on the right to present witnesses; rather, they
relate to a pervasive problem for constitutional rights understood to
consist of entitlements to exceptions from generally applicable
rules. Michael Dorf describes this concern as "the floodgates prob
lem":144 in essence, the struggle to define some principled limits
upon the entitlement in order to avoid the need to compel wide
spread exceptions that would tear apart the system of legal rules
itself. This fear, I submit, not only is well-founded with respect to
the right to present witness, but also provides the best explanation
for the willingness of the Court in Scheffer to dust off the hedges
and caveats from its earlier dicta in order to uphold a categorical
rule of exclusion.
The floodgates problem is not a farfetched, abstract, or remote
concern in this context. Some constitutional slopes are considera
bly more slippery than others. If anything, the leading academic
treatments of the right to present witnesses revel in the bursting of
floodgates. Without any apparent acknowledgment of this general
phenomenon in constitutional decisionmaking, commentators in
the area have argued vigorously for the Court to extend the right to
its seemingly logical limits as an entitlement to exceptions from
generally applicable evidence rules. Peter Westen, for instance,
states that "the defendant has a constitutional right to produce any
witnesses whose ability to give reliable evidence is something about
142. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). Given that all of the Court's decisions on
the right to present witnesses prior to Scheffer struck down the application of rules that pur
ported to limit the admission of evidence, one might try to explain the quoted language from
Taylor as an inadvertent overstatement. Taylor itself involved an issue tangentially related to
the right to present witnesses. The Court there held that a trial judge may refuse to admit
testimony as a sanction against defense counsel who "willful[ly]" fails to identify a witness, as
part of the ordinary process of pre-trial preparation, for the purpose of "seeking a tactical
advantage" vis-a-vis the prosecution. 484 U.S. at 417. The same rhetoric of limitation also
appears, however, in cases that deal squarely with the right to present witnesses and that
otherwise rule in favor of the defendant advancing the right. See supra notes 79-80 (discus
sing similar language in Chambers); Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11 ("Numerous state procedural
and evidentiary rules control the presentation of evidence and do not offend the defendant's
right to testify.").
143. See generally IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 2-3, at 42 (observing that
"[t]he 'fact-bound' character of [the Court's] as-applied holdings" in cases on the right to
present witnesses tends to leave in doubt "the precedential value of th[ose] holdings").
144.

See supra note 16.
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which reasonable people can differ."145 The implication is that even
nondiscriminatory rules generated through the ordinary process for
evidence policymaking - a process that routinely involves the se
lection of one from among many competing views of appropriate
policy - would be constitutionally vulnerable. Defendants would
merely need to identify some contrary viewpoint that a "reason
able" person might hold - something that inevitably would be
present with regard to controversial new forms of witness testi
mony. In fact, the right to present witnesses, so conceived, would
consist not merely of an entitlement to exceptions from the ordi
nary system of evidence rules but, at bottom, an argument against
the possibility of rules at all.
Robert Clinton is only somewhat less sweeping in his contention
that "the key to developing a coherent constitutional approach to
the right to defend is the

balancing

of the constitutional values of

fairness protected by the right to defend against the governmental
interests expressed in the [pertinent] procedural or evidentiary rul

ings."146 The Court, if anything, has taken this suggestion too much
to heart in cases like

Chambers, Rock,

and

Scheffer,

striking bal

ances on an ad hoc basis that cannot be reconciled by reference to
any consistent constitutional principle.
If one were to take seriously the Court's admonition against "ar
bitrary" rules that operate to exclude testimony from defense wit
nesses - as modern commentators do, to their credit - the right to
present witnesses would cut a wide swath through the law of evi
dence as we know it.147 Specifically, there are several longstanding,
145. Westen,

Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 203 (emphasis omitted).

146. Clinton, supra note 13, at 797 (emphasis in original). Clinton himself describes this
as a " 'totality of the circumstances' approach." Id. at 800. Drawing upon this view, Edward
Imwinkelried and Norman Garland describe the circumstances that may bear upon the con
stitutional inquiry in a given case. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, §§ 2-4 to
2-6, at 43-65. The bulk of their treatise is a virtual celebration of the floodgates problem,
pointing out how a balancing approach to the right to present witnesses would call into ques
tion the gamut of familiar evidence rules. See generally id., chs. 4-14. If anything, in other
writing, Imwinkelried goes even further than Clinton to suggest that the right to present
witnesses should extend to civil parties. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recogniz·

ing a New Constitutional Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases,

1990 UTAH. L. RE.v. 1. Such a move would cut loose completely the right from its moorings
in the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment for criminal trials specifically. Cf. infra section
II.C.1.b (arguing that an exception-based view of the right cannot be justified by reference to
general notions of due process independent from the specific guarantee of compulsory
process).
147. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 1-2, at 8 (noting that the Court's
decisions on the right have "the potential to revolutionize criminal evidence law"). I confine
the ensuing discussion of the floodgates problem to generally applicable evidence rules. I am
in accord with the position of Westen and Clinton, insofar as they posit that evidence rules
that peculiarly disadvantage defendants should be subject to strict scrutiny.
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bedrock rules of evidence that, in a given instance, might have the
effect of preventing defense witnesses from testifying "on the basis
of a priori categories. "148

a. Ordinary Hearsay.

One of the longest standing - though,

admittedly, not necessarily the most coherent or logical - rules of
evidence is the rule upon hearsay.149 The rule, of course, is rife with
exceptions - both those that identify specific kinds of out-of-court
statements thought sufficiently reliable to be admissible150 and, in
its contemporary form, a residual exception designed to reach
"rare[ ]" and "exceptional circumstances" where a particular state
ment has "guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding
the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions."151 But
it remains true today, as it has for centuries, that ordinary hearsay
- that is, hearsay not within any exception - is flatly inadmissible,
at least as far as the rules of evidence are concemed.152 This is one
of the most venerable "a

priori categories"

in all of evidence law.

A constitutional right to present witnesses -

if taken seriously

as an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules would shed doubt upon the categorical exclusion of ordinary hear
say. In mandating the admission of the particular hearsay testi
mony in Chambers, the Court repeatedly underscored that the
circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statements in that case
"provided considerable assurance of their reliability."153 Commen
tators properly have questioned, however, whether there are any
principled grounds upon which so to restrict the reach of

Chambers.

Clinton, for example, boldly states that "the admission of hearsay
evidence

with no extrinsic indicia of reliability might be constitu
if the evidence is of critical importance to the

tionally compelled

accused."154 Westen qualifies this notion only modestly, conceding
merely that the defense should have to show that the declarant is
148. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). For similar rhetoric, see Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1987).
149. As a general matter, a witness may not testify to an out-of-court statement made by
some other person, at least when the proponent of the witness is seeking thereby "to prove
the truth of the matter asserted" in the statement itself. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c) (defining
"hearsay").
150. See FED. R. Evm. 803 & 804(b) .
151. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065 (com
mentary on identically phrased predecessor provision to the current Rule 807).
152. See FED. R. Evm. 802. On the lengthy history of the rule against hearsay, see 2
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1364, at 1680-95.
153. 410 U.S. at 300; see also 410 U.S. at 302 ("The [hearsay) testimony rejected by the
trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness . . . .").
154. Clinton, supra note 13, at 808-09 (emphasis added).
·
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unavailable and that her out-of-court statement, at least, "is [not] so
inherently unreliable that reasonable people . . . could not ration
ally rely on it."155
Given the lineage of the rule against hearsay, one can under
stand why the Court might deploy hedges and caveats of the sort in
and later cases in an attempt to avoid casting itself upon
such a path.156 The floodgates problem does not stop here,

Chambers

however.

b. Extrinsic Evidence and Impeachment.

All of the Supreme

Court cases discussed in this Part concerned witnesses called in an
effort to set forth affirmatively the defense account of the facts.
The defense is not obligated to pursue such a strategy exclusively,
however, but may instead - or in addition - attempt to use wit
ness testimony to shed doubt upon the credibility of the crucial
prosecution witnesses. There are, of course, many ways to attack
the credibility of a witness, but one important way is to question the
general character of the witness for truthfulness - in essence, to
suggest that the witness is lying in her trial testimony, because she is
the sort of person who lies generally.157
For this kind of attack, there is a relatively well-established set
of rules, designed to avoid turning the case at hand into a trial fo
cused upon the unrelated prior behavior of a particular third-party
witness.15s The attacking party may seek to call into doubt the wit
ness's general character for truthfulness by presenting opinion or
reputation testimony from other persons and may, in the discretion
of the trial court, inquire on cross-examination into specific in
stances of the witness's conduct short of a criminal convictiont59 155. Westen,

Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 304.

156. See supra notes 79-80, 142 and accompanying text. Some commentators further sug
gest that defendants might deploy similar reasoning to call into question the best evidence
rule, which expresses a preference for original writings over other evidence attesting to the
contents thereof in much the same way that the rule against hearsay expresses a preference
for live testimony over out-of-court statements. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note
14, § 13-3, at 413-15.
157. See GREEN & NESSON, supra note 5, at 267-69 (distinguishing attacks upon the gen
eral character of the witness for truthfulness from other, familiar kinds of attacks upon wit
ness credibility).
158. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02[2], at 608-08 to 608-09 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] ("Real
dangers of confusing the issues and protracting the trial may arise from side-excursions into
the witness's past unrelated to the substantive issues being tried."); see also id. § 608.12[2], at
608-27.
159. See FED. R. Evro. 608(a) - (b). But cf. IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14,
§ 8-5, at 212 & n.56 (noting that a few states do not permit even inquiry on cross-examination
concerning prior untruthful acts of a witness, unless there was an actual criminal conviction).
Apart from the rules of evidence, the Court has relied upon the Confrontation Clause to
afford defense counsel broad flexibility with regard to the scope of cross-examination. See,
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for example, a particular occasion on which the party believes that
the witness lied. But the attacking party may not seek to prove the
occurrence of those specific instances of conduct by putting on "ex
trinsic evidence," such as the testimony of yet another witness who
observed the conduct in question.160
As the author of one leading treatise remarks: "Courts often
summarize the no-extrinsic-evidence rule by stating that 'the exam
iner must take his or her answer,' " in the sense that "the cross
examiner may not call other witnesses to prove the misconduct af
ter the witness's denial."161 From the defendant's standpoint, how
ever, it may be quite important in a given instance to use extrinsic
evidence in this prohibited manner - especially

if the

defense has

strong reason to believe that a crucial prosecution witness has lied
by denying outright, on cross-examination, that the disputed in
stance of conduct ever occurred. The defense nonetheless is, and
has long been, stuck with the witness's answer, just as the prosecu
tor would be in any effort to impeach a witness for the defense.
Indeed, the bar upon extrinsic evidence also would apply where
the prosecution has attacked the general character of a defense wit
ness for truthfulness, through cross-examination about a specific in
stance of conduct. To rehabilitate its witness, the de(ense would be
restricted to opinion or reputation testimony and, once again, could
not put on extrinsic evidence - for example, another witness with
knowledge that the disputed instance of conduct did not actually
occur.162 The law of evidence thus limits witness rehabilitation in
the same manner as witness impeachment.
This is not to say that the prohibition upon extrinsic evidence as
a technique of impeachment is a trap only for unwary defendants;
again, it applies with equal force to the prosecution. A constitue.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (holding that defendant's right of confronta
tion overrides state's interest in maintaining confidentiality of prosecution witness's status as
juvenile offender on parole, where defense sought on cross-examination to suggest possible
bias of witness to testify favorably for the prosecution due to fear of parole revocation).

160. See FED. R EVID. 608(b). Although Rule 608 was an innovation insofar as it per
mits the use of opinion testimony as a vehicle of attack in addition to reputation testimony,
see 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 608.11[1], at 608-19, the flat bar upon extrin
sic evidence of specific instances of conduct - the pertinent limitation here - has a lengthy
pedigree at common law. See infra note 198; cf. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158,
§ 608.12[3][a], at 608-28 ("Evidence is extrinsic if offered through other documents or wit
nesses rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or herself." (emphasis in
original; footnote omitted)).
161. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
notes omitted).

supra note 158, § 608.12[3][b], at 608-28 to 608-29 (foot

162. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (applying same limitation upon use of extrinsic evidence
"for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility" (emphasis added)).
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tional right on the part of defendants to present witnesses - if con
ceived as an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable
rules - nonetheless would shed considerable doubt upon this fa
miliar limitation.163
Indeed, at least one commentator takes the point a substantial
step further, by calling into doubt a related rule that does not ex
clude any witnesses by its terms but that nonetheless might have the
effect, at the margin, of discouraging the defense from calling a wit
ness. It has long been the case that a party may impeach a witness
with extrinsic evidence,

if

in the form of a prior criminal convic

tion;164 and the prospect of such impeachment is a strategic consid
eration long familiar to defense counsel in the determination of
whether to put a given witness - the defendant herself, perhaps on the stand. Westen argues that courts should bar the prosecution
from impeaching a defense witness in this manner,

if the witness's

prior conviction does not relate "significant[ly]" to her anticipated
testimony and otherwise would discourage the defense from calling
that witness.165 This �tep would take the right to present witnesses
from an entitlement in favor of the defense to a limitation upon the
prosecution's presentation of its own case.
c.

Rules of Privilege.

Both Westen and Clinton further contend

that an exception-based view, applied seriously, should lead the
Court to question the application of general rules of privilege that
otherwise would prevent a criminal defendant from obtaining the
testimony of a third-party witness.166 Westen puts the point most
emphatically when he states that " [n]o interest protected by a privi
lege is sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's right to
establish his innocence through the presentation of clearly exculpa163. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 224 (observing that a right to
present all witnesses that the jury might find exculpatory would call into doubt limitations
upon evidence "to impeach a witness for the prosecution" (footnote omitted)).
164. See FED. R. Evm. 609. This rule treats differently extrinsic evidence in the form of
an actual conviction, for the attacking party easily may prove the occurrence of the specific
instance of conduct with little sidetracking of the trial. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 158, § 608.12[2], at 608-27.
165. See Westen, Compulsory Process [, supra note 13, at 149 (contending that the Com
pulsory Process Clause "would not permit a defense witness to be impeached with evidence
of prior crimes unless the state could demonstrate a significant link between the prior crimi
nal conduct of a witness and his propensity to falsify testimony in an unrelated trial").
166. The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, provides a privilege against self-incrimination.

See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. Exercising common law authority with regard to matters of privi
lege in the federal courts, the Supreme Court has recognized a wide variety of additional,
non-constitutional privileges. For an overview thereof, see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 77, §§ 5.8-5.37, at 357-496.

March 1999]

1105

Right to Present Witnesses

tory evidence."167 Under an "arbitrary or disproportionate" stan
dard - understood as something akin to strict scrutiny in the
manner of the pre-Scheffer case law - these

"

a

priori

categories"

too would be open to doubt. Yet matters of privilege are one cor
ner of evidence law that the Court has sought specifically and re
peatedly to leave undisturbed by the right to present witnesses,
even as the Court has ruled in favor of particular defendants assert
ing that right.16s
One of the most difficult areas in this regard centers upon the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In the crimi
nal context - particularly when multiple persons may have been
involved in the underlying criminal activity - it is not uncommon
for a witness desired by the defense to refuse to testify based upon
the Fifth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has not spo
ken directly to the question, "[t]he clear majority view [of the lower
courts] is that the accused's constitutional right [to present wit
nesses] cannot override a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege
. . . . "169 In the face of this prevailing view, both Westen and Clin
ton argue that the prosecution may be constitutionally obligated to
grant immunity to such a witness in order to enable the defense to

167. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 161. But see lMwINKELRIED &
§ 10-5, at 301 (contending that Westen "is dogmatic to assume that
the accused's interest must always prevail" in the face of a claim of privilege, and counseling
instead in favor of case-by-case balancing).
GARLAND, supra note 14,

168. See, e.g., supra note 61 (discussing caveat on privilege in Washington); Rock v. Ar
kansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 n.11 (1987) (repeating caveat from Washington). Various commenta
tors have sought to develop frameworks to identify, either categorically or on a case-by-case
basis, the situations in which the right to present witnesses should override witness claims of
privilege. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Tria� 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1173,
1190, 1196 (1980) (distinguishing between privileges held by private persons and those held
by the government); Welsh S. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitu
tional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NOLOGY 377, 397 (1989) (setting
forth "three guiding principles" focused upon whether the privilege in question is "designed
to assist the government in performing one of its essential functions," whether the privilege
applies evenhandedly against the government as well as defendants, and whether the privi
lege is asserted as an obstacle to cross-examination of the witness or to compulsion of the
witness to testify at all); Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confronta
tion and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN.
L. REv. 935, 991 (1978) (calling for "in camera hearing[s] in which the court may make a
carefully structured sequence of inquiries into the relative weights of the witness and defense
interests"). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's caveats, a handful of lower courts have
suggested that a witness's assertion of at least some privileges must give way in the face of a
demand from a criminal defendant to present testimony from the witness. See White, supra,
at 382 n.31 (discussing cases).
169. See lMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 11-4, at 345. The few contrary
cases generally have involved misconduct by the prosecution, use by the prosecution of im
munized testimony, or use of a prior statement by the particular witness whom the prosecu
tion has refused to immunize for the benefit of the defense. See id. § 11-4, at 354-67.
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obtain her testimony.170 Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to explore the subject of witness immunity in depth,171 there
are some telling points that one may make with regard to the flood
gates problem and the appropriate content of the right to present
witnesses.
The lower courts have not been kind to Westen and Clinton's
view with regard to witness immunity. In fact, the leading treatise
on exculpatory evidence observes that "there is unanimity among
the courts that the accused is not even entitled to a 'missing witness'
instruction when the prosecution fails to exercise its immunity
power to make a witness's testimony available."172 Westen and
Clinton nonetheless are on to something important when they high
light the lack of parity in the ability of the prosecution and the de
fense, under current law, to obtain testimony from a witness who
resists based upon the privilege against self-incrimination.

The

prosecution has every incentive to exercise its immunity-granting
power in order systematically to advantage itself in criminal trials.
In light of this concern and notwithstanding notions of judicial def
erence for prosecutorial discretion,173 Akhil Amar recently has sug
gested that this lack of parity is quite troublesome given the core
guarantee provided by the Compulsory Process Clause: namely, a
right on the part of the defense to avail itself of the same compul
sion techniques as are available to the prosecution for the "ob
taining of witnesses."174 Even an equality-based conception of the
Compulsory Process Clause thus, at the very least, would regard
170. See Westen, Compulsory Process [, supra note 13, at 167 ("The government's pecu
liar control over potentially exculpatory witnesses imposes a constitutional obligation on it to
immunize them to obtain evidence in the defendant's favor."); see also Clinton, supra note
13, at 825-26 ("Since a grant of immunity provides an alternative which impedes the right to
defend less drastically than an unqualified recognition of the witness' right to claim privilege
at the expense of the accused, the grant of immunity would seem constitutionally compelled
under the balancing test suggested herein." (footnote omitted)).
171. See IMwJNKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 11-4, at 342 & n.110 (citing exam
ples of the "large volume of scholarly commentary" on witness immunity).
172.

Id. §

11-4, at 345.

173. A prosecutor's decision on whether to grant immunity to a given witness is an aspect
of the ultimate decision on whether to prosecute that individual. Even "use immunity" the assurance simply that the immunized testimony will not be used against the witness, not
that the witness will be free entirely from any possibility of criminal charges - can cripple a
subsequent criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (overturning the conviction of Oliver North in connection with the Iran-Contra
scandal on the ground that the prosecution was unable to show that the testimony it offered
at trial was not "shaped, directly or indirectly, by [North's earlier] compelled testimony [to a
congressional committee], regardless of how or by whom [a given witness] was exposed to
that compelled testimony" (emphasis omitted)).
174. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 134-36; see also supra section I.A (discussing the core
meaning of the Clause).
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with skepticism the Court's studied reluctance to grapple seriously
with witnesses foreclosed to the defense due to assertions of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The proposition that defendants generally should get the same
tools of witness compulsion as prosecutors nonetheless is a far cry
from the kind of free-standing entitlement that Westen and Clinton
seek to derive from the Court's precedents. It would be one thing
for the Court to embark upon the difficult job of articulating a set
of constitutional principles to ensure a level playing field with re
gard to witness immunity.175 It would be quite another thing - and
a far more sweeping change in the law - to abandon entirely
norms of prosecutorial discretion by mandating the exercise thereof
to immunize witnesses whenever a defendant might consider their
testimony helpful, even when the prosecution would regard immu
nity in any form as too high a price to bear to obtain helpful testi
mony for itself.
I underscore the foregoing examples - the rule against hearsay,
rules on witness impeachment, and rules of privilege - not to say
that the upsetting of existing law is necessarily a reason, in itself, to
interpret the Constitution so as to avoid that result. There are quite
famous instances in which the Court has uprooted longstanding
practices based upon a constitutional imperative.176 Even the view
advanced here of the right to present witnesses as a right of equal
treatment would necessitate a rethinking of existing case law.177
But the observation that the Court's current "arbitrary or dispro
portionate" standard,

if applied

in a principled manner, would call

for a radical reorientation of preexisting evidence law - including
rules that the Court itself has transmitted to Congress in the
rulemaking process178 - certainly should stand as both a substan
tial reason for caution and a powerful impetus for the seeking of
some alternative approach that would not carry such sweeping con
sequences. When viewed in this light, the Court's effort to engage
in a constitutional high-wire act - seeking to give genuine content
175. This enterprise might well lead to an increase in the formalization of criteria used by
prosecutors with respect to the granting of immunity, if only to provide a baseline against
which to evaluate refusals to exercise that power for the benefit of defendants.
176. See, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the leading
illustration in the area of individual rights.
177. Apart from the specific question of witness immunity to which I alluded earlier, see

infra section III.A (revisiting the Court's case law under an equality-based view of the right
to present witnesses).
178. Virtually all of the current Federal Rules of Evidence are the product of a rulemak
ing process that passes through the Court itself. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5,
at 4.
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to the right to present witnesses while, at the same time, trying to
avoid the floodgates problem - is not surprising. What is disap
pointing is the Court's unwillingness to deal directly with the fea
tures of its own jurisprudence that have positioned it on a high-wire
in the first place.
It is possible to imagine a system of evidence law that would
recognize a pervasive exception for the presentation of witnesses by
the defense in criminal trials. Such a move would mark a funda
mental shift from the current law of evidence. In the parlance of
jurisprudence, the current law of evidence consists of a mixture of
"rules" and "standards."179 Some features of current law are
"rules" in that they dictate the exclusion of particular types of evi
dence - hearsay, extrinsic evidence for the purpose of witness im
peachment, and so forth - on a categorical basis. Once one is
within the category described, the evidence is excluded. Other fea
tures of current law are "standards" in that they merely inform, but
do not dictate, the trial court's determination of admissibility in a
given instance. Rule

403

-

counseling the balancing of probative

value against prejudicial effect - is the classic example of such a
"standard." 180 If taken seriously, an exception-based view of the
right to present witnesses would mandate a shift from the current
mixture of "rules" and "standards" to a system composed entirely
of "standards" but no "rules" - at least with regard to witness tes
timony offered by the defense in a criminal trial. Although such a
system has never existed in this country or anywhere else insofar as
I can discern, Congress and the makers of evidence policy at the
state level are free to construct one. Contrary to the suggestion of
all modern commentators, however, such a system is not mandated
by the Constitution. Rather, as I show in the next Part, the right to
present witnesses consists of the simple but profoundly powerful
mandate that the government must do unto itself what it would do
unto defendants, absent a compelling justification othenvise.
II.

FROM EXCEPTION TO EQUALITY

In setting out the affirmative case for a conception of the right
to present witnesses as a right of equal treatment, this Part draws
179. On the distinction between "rules" and "standards" in the context of the Supreme
Court's constitutional jurisprudence, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991
Tenn - Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 57-59 (1992).
For a more detailed exposition of the distinction - cast as between "mandatory rules" and
"rules of thumb" - see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 5-6 (1991).
180. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
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there remains considerable debate over the binding force of history,
in itself, as a basis for constitutional interpretation, it is common
ground that history is at least relevant to the inquiry, if not determi
native.181 As Laurence Tribe aptly observes:

The cases are legion in which constitutional text is not completely free
of ambiguity. Yet it is often the case that, although there may be
more than one linguistically possible interpretation of a constitutional
provision, one of those possible interpretations may be the most plau
sible by a wide margin in light of structural considerations viewed
against the backdrop of the history of the provision's adoption.182
That is especially so here, given that - unlike many areas that to
day are the subject of constitutional debate - the basic setting of
the criminal trial was something quite familiar to those who drafted
and ratified the Bill of �ghts. In fact, the Sixth Amendment as a
whole stands as strong evidence that the Founding generation had
many specific thoughts on the subject. Unlike previous treatments
of the historical context of the Compulsory Process Clause, I focus
not simply upon the forerunners of that provision but, more tell
ingly, upon the contemporaneous law of evidence into which the
Constitution cast that Clause. The only way to account for the
then-widespread disqualification of all interested persons as wit
nesses - let alone the complete absence of any contemporaneous
recognition that the Bill of Rights would alter that practice - is to
understand the right to present witness in equality-based terms.
As part of my overall enterprise to question the compartmental
ization of the Constitution by the legal academy, I go on to discuss
several structural considerations that lend further support to an
equality-based conception of the right. Specifically, I look not only
to the right of confrontation recognized by the constitutional text
most closely proximate to the Compulsory Process Clause, but also
to two other matters not discussed by commentators in the area to
date: namely, principles concerning the appropriate structure of
rulemaking institutions and recent debate over exception- and
equality-based views of other constitutional rights. Finally, I argue
that, completely apart from doctrine, criminal defendants as a
181. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990) ("[T]here is no need to presup
pose agreement about an 'originalist' (or any other) theory of constitutional interpretation.
Even opponents of originalism generally agree that the historical understanding [of the Con
stitution] is relevant, if not dispositive. ).
"

182. Laurence H. 'llibe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Fonn
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1221, 1278-79 (1995) (emphasis in
original).
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whole may well be better off in practical terms under an equality
based view - especially so, the more skeptical one is about the
willingness of evidence policymakers to weigh seriously the inter
ests of criminal defendants.
A.

Historical Context

Previous commentators on the right to present witnesses cer
tainly have not ignored the historical antecedents of the Compul
sory Process Clause,183 though they generally regard them as not
pointing absolutely in favor of an exception- or an equality-based
view. One feature of the historical record is common ground, how
ever: There was essentially no discussion of the Clause or its impli
cations for then-existing law at the time of the Bill of Rights.
Previous commentators have missed the significance of this datum
in the historical record, largely because they overlook the context in
which it occurred. The silence of observers at the time is a crucial
piece of the puzzle, but only when one first recognizes the features
of the contemporaneous law of evidence.184
1.

Textual Forerunners

Prior to the Bill of Rights, only New Jersey referred explicitly in
its constitution to notions of equality between prosecutors and de
fendants with regard to witnesses.185 Most of the contemporary
state constitutions that spoke to the subject, instead, conferred
upon criminal defendants a right to "produce," "call for," or "ex
amine" favorable "proofs" or "evidence," without explicit reference
to principles of equality vis-a-vis the prosecution or, for that matter,
183. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 728-39; Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13,
at 90-108.
184. This would not be the first time that silence served as a crucial piece of evidence in
the reconstruction of past events. The key datum that enables Sherlock Holmes to Unlock
the mystery at the heart of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Silver Blaze consists of the silence of an
otherwise fierce dog stationed in a stable. Holmes infers from the dog's silence that the
unknown person who made his way into the barn on the night in question must have been
someone very familiar to the animal, such that it did not respond by barking. See ARTHUR
CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE CLASSIC MYSTERIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 332, 336
(Longmeadow Press 1992) (1892). The absence of any contemporaneous recognition that the
Bill of Rights would dramatically reorient then-existing evidence law is, in the present con
text, the equivalent of the dog that did not bark.
185. See N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. XVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF Rrmrrs 408
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter Cogan] ("[A]ll criminals shall be admitted to the same
Privileges of Witnesses and Council, as their Prosecutors are or shall be entitled to." (empha
sis added)); cf. N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1787 para. 6, reprinted in Cogan, supra, at 410 ("Writs
and Process shall be granted freely and without Delay, to all Persons requiring the same.").
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to any concept of "compulsory process" per se.1 86 In keeping with
this language in their own constitutions, various state ratifying con
ventions called for the addition to the original federal Constitution
of a bill of rights to recognize, among other things, a right of crimi
nal defendants to "produc[e]" or to "call for" "evidence" in their
favor.187 Indeed, if read without regard to their historical con
text,188 these forerunners of the Compulsory Process Clause might
tend to suggest precisely the kind of free-standing right to present
witnesses - that is, a right beyond parity or equality with the pros
ecution - recognized by the Supreme Court today.
186. See MAss. CONST. of 1780 pt. I, art. XVII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 404
("[E]very subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favourable to
him
"); N.H. CONST. of 1783 pt. I, art. XV, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 405
("[E]very subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favourable to him
self."); PA. CoNST. of 1776 ch. I, art. IX, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 411 (right "to
call for evidence in his favour"); VT. CoNsT. of 1777 ch. I, art. 10, reprinted in Cogan, supra
note 185 at 413 (right "to call for Evidence in his Favor"); DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776
§ 14, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to examine evidence on oath in his
favour"); VA. DEcL. OF RIGHTS of 1776 art VIII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 413
(right "to call for evidence in his favour"). It is unclear from the face of the state constitu
tions whether the references to "proofs" carried with them generally applicable limitations
upon the process of proof or, similarly, whether the references to "evidence" carried with
them generally applicable limitations upon the types of evidence considered admissible at
trial. But cf. infra section 11.A.2 (arguing that the state constitutional provisions remained
subject to generally applicable limitations of evidence law, given the nature and extent of
such limitations in contemporaneous common law).
.

•

•

.

At least one state - Maryland - explicitly treated the process for the production of
witnesses in a manner distinct from their examination at trial, conferring separate rights with
respect to each. Mn. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776 art. 19, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at
403 (right "to have process for his witnesses [and] to examine the witnesses for and against
him on oath"). Another state - North Carolina - provided simply that the accused shall
have the right "to confront the Accusers and Witnesses with other Testimony." N.C. DECL.
OF RIGHTS OF 1776 art. VII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 410-11. No pertinent
references appear in the constitutions of Georgia, Rhode Island, or South Carolina.
187. The New York proposal stated specifically that "in all Criminal Prosecutions, the
Accused ought . . . to have the means of producing his Witnesses." N.Y. Proposal, July 26,
1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 401. Other states proposed the addition of a
right to "call for" favorable "evidence." See N.C. Proposal, Aug. 1, 1788, reprinted in Cogan,
supra note 185, at 401 (right "to call for evidence"); Pa. Minority Proposal, Dec. 12, 1787,
reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to call for evidence in his favor"); R.I.
Proposal, May 29, 1790, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to call for evidence
. . . in his favour"); Va. Proposal, June 27, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402
(right "to call for evidence . . . in his favor"); cf. Statement of Gov. Randolph at Va. Ratifying
Convention, June 15, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 435 ("Calling of evidence in
[the prisoner's] favor is coincident to his trial."); The Impartial Examiner, No. 1, VA. INDEP.
ClmoN., Feb. 27 & Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 468 (criticizing the
absence of a provision in the original federal Constitution that would prevent Congress from
putting into force "a law that persons charged with capital crimes . . . shall not . . . call for
evidence in their favor" (emphasis in original)).
188. See infra section 11.A.2 (arguing that the pervasive disqualification of interested wit
nesses at the time of these state constitutional provisions undercuts the inference that the
quoted language recognized a free-standing right to present witnesses, as distinct from a right
to equal treatment vis-a-vis the prosecution).
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In drafting the Sixth Amendment, however, James Madison cu
riously used none of these examples. In particular, he did not select
language from the various states to refer explicitly to the calling of
witnesses or the producing of evidence generally, opting instead for
a right on the part of the accused simply "to have compulsory pro
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor."189 If Madison's handi
work and its forerunners were the extent of the historical record,
then one would be hard pressed to come down distinctly in favor of
either an exception- or an equality-based reading. There is more,
however.
Given the apparent uniqueness of Madison's wording in the
Compulsory Process Clause, especially in light of the state constitu
tions and proposals, one might have thought that there would have
been considerable discussion of the Clause at the time. But, as pre
vious commentators accurately observe, that was not so. In fact,
during the consideration of the Bill of Rights in Congress and by
the various states, there was essentially no discussion of the presen
tation of witnesses.190 At the very least,

if contemporary observers

had understood the Bill of Rights to mandate sweeping change in
the then-existing law of evidence, one would have expected them to
say something. They did not. Writing of this puzzling silence, one
commentator states that "[t]he sixth amendment was noncontrover
sial (aside from the requirement that the jury be drawn from the
district where the crime occurred) because its principles were al
ready accepted at common law."191 But what

was the contempora-

189. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 97
(referring to "Madison's unique phrasing"). As Westen observes, Madison did not select
wording to refer explicitly to notions of equality, notwithstanding the existence of New
Jersey's formulation to that effect. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 256
n.230; cf. supra note 185 (discussing New Jersey's formulation). It is a mistake, however, to
draw from this observation the inference that "the framers of the compulsory process clause
certainly knew how to formulate the clause on a principle of equality and, presumably, would
have done so if they so desired." Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 256 n 230
That would prove far too much, for the same reasoning would shed doubt upon the funda
mental notion that the Compulsory Process Clause extends not just literally to the "compul
sory process" used to haul recalcitrant witnesses into court, but also to the admissibility of
witness testimony. Cf. supra section I.A. Madison just as strikingly did not select a formula
tion that would refer to the latter issue - again, notwithstanding the many state examples,
see supra note 186, that pointed in that direction.
Clinton reads Madison's word choice more evenhandedly, observing simply that: "No
one suggested that the Massachusetts protection of the 'right to produce all proofs, that may
be favorable to [the accused]' ought to be added. No one urged either the New Jersey lan
guage, which guaranteed equality between prosecution and defense in regards to witnesses
and counsel . . . ." Clinton, supra note 13, at 736.
190. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 735; Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at
98.
191. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 77.
.

.
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neous common law of evidence? It is to that central question that I
now turn.

2.

Contemporaneous Evidence Law

At the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the common
law of evidence uniformly and categorically disqualified criminal
defendants from testifying under oath in their own defense. This
disqualification was not directed against criminal defendants specif
ically but, instead, arose from a generally applicable disqualification
of all interested persons as witnesses.192 Ironically enough, the
Supreme Court's first case touching upon the relationship between
the Constitution and the presentation of witnesses by criminal de
fendants

-

Ferguson v. Georgia

-

contains its most detailed his

torical treatment of witness disqualification at common law.193
That a general rule disqualifying interested persons as witnesses
was firmly and uniformly established at the time of the Bill of
Rights is not, and cannot be, seriously disputed. Nor, as recounted
above, is there disagreement among scholars as to the lack of any
contemporaneous recognition that the Sixth Amendment, or the
Bill of Rights generally, would necessitate drastic change in the
common law of evidence concerning the presentation of witnesses
in criminal trials. The problem, to put it bluntly, is that both the
Court and academic commentators heretofore have failed to put
two and two together.
The

only way to reconcile the notion of a constitutional right to

present witnesses with the contemporaneous common law is to un
derstand the right as one of equal treatment. If the Compulsory
Process Clause, or the Bill of Rights more generally, really did af
ford a free-standing right to admit exculpatory evidence notwith
standing generally applicable evidence rules, then one surely would
have expected someone at least to mention this tumultuous change
192. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961) ("Disqualification for interest was
. . . extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed. . . . Here, as in England,
criminal defendants were deemed incompetent as witnesses.").
193. See 365 U.S. at 573-82. As the Court explained, "the principal rationale of the rule"
in the sixteenth century consisted of "the possible untrustworthiness of the party's testimony;
for the same reason disqualification was applied in the seventeenth century to interested
nonparty witnesses." 365 U.S. at 573; see also 365 U.S. at 574 (tracing the extension of this
reasoning to the criminal context); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1892) ("It
is familiar knowledge that the old common law carefully excluded from the witness stand
parties to the record, and those who were interested in the result; and this rule extended to
both civil and criminal cases. Fear of perjury was the reason for the rule."). For more exten
sive discussion of witness disqualification for interest at common law, see 1 WIGMORE, supra
note 26, § 575, at 688-98.
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in then-existing practice. No such recognition appears in the histor
ical record.
If anything, the absence of any such reference is especially note
worthy given the presence of language in contemporary state con
stitutions that provided criminal defendants with the right to
"produce" or to "call for" favorable evidence.194 The absence of
outcry strongly suggests that even that language - more explicitly
directed to the admissibility of witness testimony at trial than the
reference to "compulsory process" that Madison ultimately in
cluded in the Sixth Amendment - was not understood at the time
to entitle defendants to exceptions from generally applicable evi
dence rules. The states otherwise would have been unable to main
tain for decades195 their categorical disqualification of all interested
witnesses simply as a matter of state constitutional law, wholly
apart from the federal Constitution.
In fact, to the present day, some states among the original thir
teen colonies have retained language in their respective state con
stitutions that recognizes a right to "produce" or to "call for"
favorable evidence. 1 96 Surprisingly few courts within these states
have had occasion to parse these provisions in recent years. But
even those courts do not regard their respective state constitutions
as affording a free-standing right to present witnesses in violation of

generally applicable rules of evidence.1 91

The restrictions that governed the qualification of witnesses in
the eighteenth century are now archaic relics, but many other long
standing, generally applicable restrictions remain.

In recounting

the history of the prohibition upon extrinsic evidence as a means of
witness impeachment, for instance, Wigmore observes that
194. See supra note 186.
195. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 575 {observing that efforts to reform witness qualification
rules did not begin until the nineteenth century).

196. See Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21; MAss. CoNST. pt. I, art. XII; N.H. CoNsT. pt. I,
art. XV; VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 10; VA. DECL OF RIGHTS art. I, § VIII.
197. See State v. Newcomb, 663 A.2d 613, 618 (N.H. 1995) {"A defendant has the right,
under . . . the [New Hampshire] State Constitution, to produce all proofs favorable to his
defense. This, however, does not entitle him to introduce evidence in violation of rules of
evidence."); State v. Johnson, 465 A.2d 1366, 1368 {Vt. 1983) ("Defendant's argument that
. . . the Vermont Constitution gives him an independent right, totally divorced from any rules
of evidence, . . . is unfounded. . . . [T]he 'evidence in his favor' must be otherwise admissible
under the law of evidence . . . .") . See generally Oliva v. Co=onwealth, 452 S.E.2d 877, 880
{Va. Ct. App. 1995) (construing right "to call for evidence in [one's] favor" to mean that, "[i]f
the evidence [that the defendant] presented and proffered clearly and directly pointed to
another person as the guilty party, the trial judge was required to admit that evidence which
was relevant and material, provided that it was otherwise admissible").
• . •
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[t]owards the end of the 1600s appears a tendency to exclude it; and
though the rule of exclusion did not become completely settled until
the end of the next century, and though there are instances enough of
its being ignored down to that time, nevertheless, it was always
treated, from the beginning of the 1700s, as a rule that might be
invoked.198
The rule against hearsay,

if anything, has

even deeper roots in the
99
common law of evidence.1
Again, had the Constitution mandated
change to these generally applicable rules for witness testimony,
one would have expected at least some intimation to that effect.

Again, silence.
This is most emphatically not to say that the law is stuck forever
with the evidence rules prevalent in the late eighteenth century.
Quite to the contrary, the generation that drafted and ratified the
Constitution left open a wide vista for change and refinement - for
an evolving law of evidence, so to speak - through the instrument
of common law courts and, later, by way of evidence rules enacted
by legislatures. It is no longer the case that interested persons are
disqualified as witnesses, and that is a very good thing. But, given
the historical record, it is folly to say that such a change was consti
tutionally mandated, as distinct from being the product of what we
today consider a more enlightened conception of evidence policy.
The significance of the witness qualification rules of the eighteenth
century lies not in any binding authority that they might have upon
the present with regard to competency questions but, instead, in the
way that those rules shed light upon the broader principle enshrined
in the Constitution to constrain those who would revise evidence
law in the centuries thereafter.
Modern commentators err by treating arguments from history
as straw men - in essence, by positing a false choice between blind
adherence to the evidence rules of the eighteenth century and a
dynamic, responsive law of evidence adapted to the conditions and
thinking of the twentieth.200 My contention is that one can have the
latter - indeed, plenty of it - while still looking to historical con
text to discern the content of the constitutional constraints upon
evidence reform.
As of the late eighteenth century, it was thought perfectly ac

ceptable for the law to prevent a criminal defendant from testifying

198. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 979, at 1102.
199. See supra note 152.
200. See, e.g., Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 114 (applauding the Court
for rejecting a "strictly historical test" based upon the "dead hand of the common-law rule of
1789").
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under oath, at least as part of a generally applicable prohibition
upon testimony by all interested persons. Several decades after the
ratification of the Constitution, that view came under attack on pol
icy grounds. As an illustration of the ordinary process of evidence
reform at work, the Court itself has recounted that "[b]roadside as
saults upon the entire structure of disqualifications, particularly the
disqualification for interest, were launched early in the nineteenth
century in both England and America. "201 By the later part of the
nineteenth century, "most of the States now comprising the Union"
had dropped the disqualification of criminal defendants to testify
under oath.202

From a constitutional standpoint, the problem

comes only when particular jurisdictions drop the general disqualifi
cation of witnesses for interest but still retain the disqualification
for criminal defendants in particular. That is precisely the situation
that the Court faced in Ferguson, and the Court was eminently cor
rect to invalidate, in practical effect, the Georgia disqualification of
defendants implicated in that case.203
One sees the same process of evidence reform at work with re
gard to the disqualification of accomplices as witnesses. As the
Court recognized in

Washington

v.

Texas,

that rule also originated

in the broader disqualification of interested persons and, as such,
existed at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.204 The
constitutional problem arose in the nineteenth century, when the
states dropped the general disqualification for interested persons indeed, when all but Georgia dropped the disqualification of crimi
nal defendants as such - but Texas persisted in retaining a disqual
ification

specifically

directed

against

the

presentation

of an

accomplice as a witness for the defense.205 Again, the problem
201. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 575 (1961).
202. See 365 U.S. at 577.
203. See supra section I.B.1.
204. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1967).
205. See 388 U.S. at 17 n.4 (noting that, apart from the law of Texas at the time of Wash·
ington, "no statutes from other jurisdictions . . . flatly disqualif[ied] coparticipants in a crime
from testifying for each other regardless of whether they are tried jointly or separately"); cf. 1
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 580 at 714-16 (contending that, upon elimination by statute of the
disqualification of defendants as witnesses, "[t]here ought to-day to be no further question
. . . that there is no limitation whatever on the qualification of a co-indictee or co-defendant
to testify either for or against the accused").
Westen thus errs when he claims that, "[b]y invalidating a rule of competency that was
well-established in 1791, the Court in Washington rejected the historical view of the compul
sory process clause." Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 254. In 1791, it cer
tainly was true that accomplices were incompetent to testify. That disqualification came not
in the form of a rule that peculiarly disadvantaged criminal defendants but, rather, as part of
a broader, evenhanded disqualification of interested persons. What the Court struck down in
Washington was most assuredly not the "well-established" law as it existed in 1791 but, in-
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stems from the lack of evenhandedness, not from any binding con
stitutional force that the eighteenth-century law of evidence may
have upon modem times.

3.

The First Congress

Apart from the contemporaneous law of evidence, the actions of
the First Congress are consistent with an equality-based view of the
right to present witnesses.206 The First Congress provided by stat
ute that a person accused of treason - a federal crime shall be allowed and admitted in his said defence to make any proof
that he or they can produce, by lawful witness or witnesses, and shall
have like process of the court where he or they shall be tried, to com
pel his or their witnesses to appear at his or their trial, as is usually
granted to compel witnesses to appear on the prosecution against
them.201

The statute thus not only recognizes a right to "admit[ ]" witness
testimony distinct from a right to compulsory process,2°8 it also ex
plicitly limits the right to present witnesses by the word "lawful."
That word choice suggests that the right is not a free-standing enti
tlement to present all witnesses that the defense might consider
helpful but, rather, an entitlement that remains subject to the con
straints upon the presentation of witnesses enacted through the or
dinary "law[ ]" making process.209
stead, a variation that was anything but evenhanded - namely, a body of law that had arisen
in Texas much later, in the nineteenth century, after the elimination of the general disqualifi
cation for interested witnesses.

206. As in other areas of constitutional debate, commentators on the right to present
witnesses point to the actions of the Frrst Congress as evidence of contemporaneous under
standing. See, e.g., Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 100-01.
207. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (emphasis added). With only
cosmetic modifications in pertinent part, this provision remains in force to the present day,
though it now applies more broadly to all federal capital cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994).
208. That the Frrst Congress saw fit to enact into statute an assurance with regard to the
"admi[ssion]" of "witness" testimony might suggest that such a guarantee did not already
exist as part of the Constitution. It would not be unheard of, however, for Congress to rein
force or to clarify by statute the content of preexisting law. In fact, with regard to the portion
of the statute that concerns compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses, Chief Justice
John Marshall - riding circuit - remarked in passing that the statute "ought to be consid
ered as declaratory of the common law in cases where th[e] constitutional right [to compul
sory process under the Sixth Amendment] exists." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (granting subpoena to enable treason defendant Aaron Burr to obtain
certain disputed letters and orders in the hands of the President). Cf. 25 F. Cas. at 33 (adding
"that with respect to the means of compelling the attendance of witnesses to be furnished by
the court, the prosecution and defence are placed by the law on equal ground" (emphasis
added)). Chief Justice Marshall had no occasion, however, to construe specifically the por
tion of the statute entitling persons accused of treason to "make any proof that he or they can
produce by lawful witness or witnesses."
209. Westen draws attention to the portion of the statute concerning "process of the
court" but does not make anything of the portion that deals most directly with the presenta-
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This reading of the historical record draws additional support
from further actions of the First Congress. In the Judiciary Act of
1789, the First Congress provided that the federal courts shall use
the common law of evidence.210 In so doing, Congress presumably
did not regard the prominent features of the common law at the
time to be contrary - at least, not in any stark or fundamental way
- to the guarantees in the then-pending Bill of Rights. For the
reasons set forth earlier, the common law of evidence in the eight
eenth century strongly supports a view of the right to present wit
nesses as a right to equal treatment.
B.

The Confrontation Clause

In a sense, the choice between an equality-based and an
exception-based view turns upon the plausibility of a further claim:
namely, that the Constitution permits the making of categorical de
terminations of admissibility that, as applied in a given instance,
might restrict the presentation of defense witnesses in criminal tri
als. Writing of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence as a whole,
one commentator astutely observes that "[t]he recurring distinction
in constitutional law between 'categorization' and 'balancing' is a
version of the rules/standards distinction.

Categorization corre

sponds to rules, balancing to standards.
nomic.

Categorization is taxo
B alancing weighs competing rights or interests. " 21 1

Rhetoric railing against the use of "a priori categories" certainly is a
common feature of the Court's most expansive treatments of the
right to present witnesses.212
Whatever one might think of the Court's rhetoric as a matter of
evidence policy, the foregoing historical account indicates that the
early common law of evidence made categorical determinations
with far greater frequency - and far, far more draconian effect than current law but that those determinations nonetheless were
tion of "witness" testimony. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 100-01. As
a result, Westen attributes no significance to the word "lawful," notwithstanding that it, at the
very least, sheds doubt upon his conception of the constitutional right to present witnesses as
an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules of evidence. Indeed, wholly
apart from the guarantees of the Constitution, the pertinent portion of the statute itself
would appear to leave treason defendants entirely at the mercy of the applicable "law" con
cerning "admi[ssibility]" - that is, insofar as the statute is concerned, to permit "law[s]" that
are not evenhanded as between prosecution and defense.

210. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (providing that "the mode of proof
by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall be the same in all the
courts of the United States . . . as of actions at co=on law").
211. Sullivan, supra note 179,
212. See supra note 148.

at

59.
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not considered forbidden by the newly-enacted Bill of Rights. One
need not rest exclusively upon history, however, for this inference.
Rather, the Court's own analysis of the related guarantee of the
Confrontation Clause213 - and, for that matter, the major compet
ing view of the Clause found amongst the Justices themselves and
recent academic commentary - strongly support the permissibility
of categorical determinations with regard to the admission of wit
ness testimony in criminal trials.
It is fitting that the Compulsory Process Clause and the Con
frontation Clause should be "textually adjoining" within the Sixth
Amendment, each being the "fraternal twin" of the other.214 The
Compulsory Process Clause "guarantees the accused a basis for in
troducing evidence 'in his favor,' " and the Confrontation Clause
"guarantees the accused a basis for challenging the evidence
'against him' " through the confrontation of prosecution wit
nesses.21s Both the Supreme Court itself216 and academic commen
tators217 have remarked, in general terms, upon the connection
between the two Clauses.

To date, however, surprisingly few

sources have attempted to draw upon the Confrontation Clause to
inform our understanding of the right to present witnesses implicit
in the Compulsory Process Clause.218 And none have done so in
213. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VI {"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
214. See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor
Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 {1998).
215. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 154-55; see also Westen, Compul
sory Process II, supra note 13, at 280 (describing the Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Clauses as "parallel provisions for securing the attendance of witnesses in criminal cases").
216. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 {1967) ("Just as an aecused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.").
217. See supra notes 214-15.
218. Westen is noteworthy in his recognition of this connection. In his view, the significance of the two Clauses, understood together, is simply to
allocate[ ] between the prosecution and the defense the burden of taking the initiative in
identifying the witnesses to be produced - placing on the prosecution the burden of
confronting the defendant with witnesses "against" him, and placing on the defendant
the burden of identifying and requesting the production of witnesses "in his favor."
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 602. In this observation, Westen is correct. He
justifies his exception-based reading of the right to present witnesses, however, with an im
plausibly broad interpretation of the prosecution's obligations under the Confrontation
Clause.
Drawing largely upon a position embraced at one time by Justice Harlan, Westen reads
the Confrontation Clause to forbid the prosecution from using hearsay statements from any
witness who remains available to testify. See Peter Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 11
MrCH. L. REv. 1185, 1188-89 (1979) [hereinafter Westen, Future of Confrontation]; see also
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 582. The Court as a whole, and Justice Harlan in
particular, specifically have repudiated such a position for it would, among other things,
deem unconstitutional the many longstanding hearsay exceptions that do not depend upon a
·
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light of the significant developments in the Court's confrontation
jurisprudence in recent years. As I now explain, a view of the right
to present witnesses as a right of equal treatment would bring that
right more closely into line with the Court's current approach to
confrontation.
The major challenge facing the Court in the confrontation area
is not unlike the one that arises under the right to present witnesses:
namely, how to reconcile a constitutional guarantee with longstand
ing features of the common law of evidence. In the confrontation
context, the challenge has centered upon the exceptions to the rule
against hearsay, the whole point of which is to make admissible cer
tain kinds of hearsay in lieu of in-court testimony by the declarant
- that is, testimony that would be subject to confrontation by way
of cross-examination at trial.
Here, the Court has shown itself fully prepared to embrace evi
dence rules that identify, on a categorical basis, situations in which
out-of-court statements are generally reliable - where the circum
stances under which the statements are made, in themselves, pro
vide a rough substitute for actual "confront[ation]" by the
defendant at trial. In fact, the Court has gone even further, stating
that some forms of hearsay are actually better than in-court testi
mony in that the "same factors that contribute to the statements'
reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testi
mony."219 Thus, for example, the Court has upheld under the Con
frontation Clause the admission as prosecution evidence of
coconspirators' statements,220 present sense impressions,221 and
statements made in the course of receiving medical treatment,222
without regard to the availability of the declarant to testify. For
other out-of-court statements that are not reliable in their own right
showing of unavailability. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (upholding admission of
hearsay under Illinois exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements in the course
of medical examinations, without a showing of unavailability); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (repudiating his earlier position in California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); cf. FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing no less than
twenty-three hearsay exceptions that do not turn upon a showing of unavailability).
219. See White, 502 U.S. at 355-56; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395
(1986) (similarly noting, with respect to coconspirators' statements, that "[e]ven when the
declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion
of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy").
220. See Inad� 415 U.S. at 399-400 (upholding application of FED. R. Evm.
801(d)(2)(E)).
221. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 (upholding application of Illinois counterpart to FED. R.
EvID. 803(2)).
222. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 (upholding application of Illinois counterpart to FED. R.
Evm. 803(4)).
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but simply stand as a second-best substitute for in-court testimony,
the Court has upheld the admission of hearsay, upon a showing by
the prosecution that the declarant is unavailable.223 The upshot of
these moves in the Court's recent confrontation jurisprudence has
been to endorse the constitutional permissibility of the hearsay ex
ceptions set forth in the current Federal Rules of Evidence - some
of the most categorical features of both the common law of evi
dence and current law.
This development has met with criticism, as one of the very few
instances in which the Court has tied closely the substance of a con
stitutional guarantee to the content of ordinary legislation - albeit
in the form of evidence rules with deep roots in hearsay doctrine
developed over the centuries at common law. But even under the
leading alternative view of the Confrontation Clause embraced, in
various forms, by at least two members of the current Court224 and
a variety of recent commentary,225 a categorical approach would be
used. Merely its focus would change.
This alternative view takes issue with the implicit premise of the
Court's current approach that the admission of hearsay statements
as evidence for the prosecution necessarily amounts to the presen
tation of "witnesses against" the defendant within the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause. The word "witnesses," in ordinary par
lance, does not include people who make statements outside of the
courthouse.226 Under the alternative position, the question simply
is: What subset of out-of-court statements should be treated as the
equivalent of actual testimony from "witnesses" in court and, as
such, must be subject to confrontation by the defense? Although
the Justices and commentators who embrace this alternative view
have answered this question with various shadings and subtleties,
the common and crucial insight is that hearsay should be under
stood to implicate the Confrontation Clause only when it consists of
statements that the government itself might generate through coer
cion or fabrication (such as statements made while the declarant is
in police custody) or that are otherwise made in a formal, legal con
text (such as testimony at a grand jury proceeding, which the jury
223. See lnad� 415 U.S. at 394-95 (explaining rationale for admission of prior testimony
from an unavailable declarant, upheld earlier in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
224. See White, 502 U.S. at 358-66 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).
225. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 15, at 125-31; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. LJ. 1011 (1998). For a similar view, see also Margaret
A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Mode� 16 MINN. L. REv. 557 (1992).
226. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 127.
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might see as the equivalent of actual "witness[ ] " testimony at
trial).227
In short, under either the Court's approach or its major compet
itor, the meaning of the Confrontation Clause centers upon cate
gorical determinations capable, for the most part, of being made in
advance of any particular dispute over the admissibility of witness
testimony. Under either approach, categorization - informed by
text, experience, and the objectives of the Confrontation Clause holds sway. The striking thing is that

no one

on the Court claims

that it should apply the Confrontation Clause by focusing upon the
testimony to be provided by the particular prosecution "witnesses"
at issue in a given instance and, from there, ascertaining their incul
patory significance in the specific case at hand. For the Court, the
question is not, and has

never been,

whether the incriminatory force

of the disputed prosecution testimony, in the circumstances of a
particular case, is such that a right of confrontation might be espe
cially useful to the defense - even though confrontation might
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury. Indeed, in a
thoughtful recent essay advocating a version of the alternative ap
proach summarized here, Richard Friedman specifically rejects the
notion that the Confrontation Clause "should be applied on a case
by-case basis with an eye to what
the particular case."22s

will

assist accurate factfinding in

Having taken a categorical approach for the right of the defend
ant to be confronted with the "witnesses against" him, the Court
should not shy from the same approach for the related right of the
227. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testi
monial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was this
discrete category of testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors as a
means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process . . . . "); accord
AMAR, supra note 15, at 129 ("[W]e must properly read the word witness to encompass vide
otapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when prepared for court use and introduced as
testimony." (italics in original)); id. at 131 (distinguishing between "general out-of-court dec
larations - one friend talking to another, often even before the government is involved and governmentally prepared depositions"); Berger, supra note 225, at 561 ("Hearsay state
ments procured by agents of the prosecution or police should . . . stand on a different footing
[for purposes of the Confrontation Clause] than hearsay created without governmental intru
sion."); Friedman, supra note 225, at 1026 ("[T]he confrontation right applies only to a subset
of hearsay declarants, those who are deemed to have made testimonial statements and so
have acted as witnesses."); id. at 1042-43 (providing examples).
228. Friedman, supra note 225, at 1028. 1\vo recent commentators do embrace a view
that would appear to entail case-by-case consideration. Charles Nesson and Yochai Benkler
would have the right of confrontation depend largely upon whether the prosecution is able to
come up with corroboration for a given out-of-court statement offered against the defendant.
See Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational
Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. RE.v. 149, 173 (1995).
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defendant to present "witnesses in his favor.'1 In particular,

if the

Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of a categorical ap
proach with regard to out-of-court statements - even those that
may be devastatingly incriminating to the defendant - it is hard to
see why the Court should decry the use of

"

a

priori

categories"

under the Compulsory Process Clause. As one commentator accu
rately notes, "[t]he danger of mistaken convictions arising from un
reliable out-of-court evidence is the same whether caused by
deficiencies in the state's evidence or by deficiencies in the defend
ant's evidence. "229
For out-of-court statements by persons not called as actual "wit
nesses" for the prosecution at trial, it remains true that defense
counsel may note their absence as a way to shed doubt upon the
prosecution's case. By contrast, defense counsel certainly could not
summarize for the jury the substance of the expected testimony
from a defense witness deemed inadmissible under a generally ap
plicable evidence rule. But that plainly would not preclude the de
fense from seeking to use information gleaned from that witness as
a means by which to identify other, admissible evidence.230 The de
fense, in short, has a second-best alternative to the excluded de
fense testimony in the same way that defense commentary about
the prosecution's reliance upon hearsay stands as a second-best al
ternative to actual, in-court confrontation of the declarant. That is
not to say that the second-best alternative to the desired defense
testimony necessarily will be as good, or even nearly as good, as the
testimony itself. But the same is true of comments by defense
counsel to note the absence of a declarant whose out-of-court state
ments form the crucial incriminatory evidence for the prosecution.
Such comments are likely to be especially unavailing when the justi
fication for admitting hearsay as prosecution evidence in the first
place is that the surrounding circumstances make it

more

reliable

than testimony that the declarant might give at trial.231 The Court
nonetheless has not regarded the prospect of such an imperfect perhaps, in a given case, totally ineffective - second-best alterna
tive to preclude the admission of hearsay as prosecution evidence
under the Confrontation Clause. The same should hold true for the
229.
230.

Westen,

Unified Theory,

supra note

13,

at

597.

For instance, it apparently had not occurred to defense counsel in Rock to have an
expert examine the gun used in the disputed shooting until the defendant intimated, after
undergoing hypnosis, that the gun may have discharged accidentally. See Rock v. Arkansas,

483 U.S. 44, 47 (1987).
231. See supra note 219

and accompanying text.
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of desired

defense

testimony.
C.

Institutional Structure and Related Constitutional
"Compartments"

The justifications for an equality-based view of the right to pres
ent witnesses are not confined simply to the history of common law
evidence rules or related guarantees of the Sixth Amendment con
cerning witnesses in criminal trials.

Rather, as I contend here,

structural insights from the core institutional features of the crimi
nal system strongly support the greater degree of deference that an
equality-based view would accord to the makers of evidence rules,
as compared to current law. I explain how these structural insights
help to distinguish the demand for equal treatment in the present
context from instances in which the Due Process Clause mandates
aspects of criminal procedure that tilt the playing field for the pro
tection of defendants - most prominently, the reasonable doubt

In re Winship232 and the obligation of the
Brady v. Maryland233 and its progeny to turn

standard recognized in
prosecution under

over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Finally, in keeping with
my effort to question the growing compartmentalization of the
Constitution in academic circles, I turn to a conceptually similar
problem of constitutional law that initially might seem unrelated to
the rights of criminal defendants. Specifically, I use structural in
sights to explain how the switch advocated here from an exception
based to an equality-based view of the right to present witnesses
avoids a major pitfall attributed to the similar switch in
the Free Exercise Clause.

Employ

ment Division v. Smith234 for
1.

Structuring the Making of Rules

Frederick Schauer has observed that legal rules are significant
not simply for their substantive content but also for the manner in
which they reflect upon institutional arrangements.235 This general
point has garnered far too little attention in connection with the
making of evidence rules and the right to present witnesses. One
may explain much about the relationship between rules and rights
in this area by reference to the core institutional features of the
U.S. 358 (1970).
U.S. 83 (1963).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See SCHAUER, supra note

232. 397

233. 373
234.
235.

179, at 158-62.
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criminal system. As to the admissibility of witness testimony at
trial, whether for the prosecution or for the defense, the govern
ment acts in two distinct roles. Arms of the government serve not
only as the makers of evidence rules (increasingly, legislatures) but
also as one of the parties that stands to benefit from application of
those rules (in the government's capacity as prosecutor). There are
fairly obvious reasons for a democracy to empower government in
stitutions to delineate not only the ground rules for criminal trials
but also what constitutes crime itself. In addition, it has long been
true that prosecutorial power in the criminal sphere resides with
government officials rather than private persons. When it comes to
the prosecution of crime, the government essentially has

a

monopoly.
Although individual agents of the government may be criminal
defendants in particular instances, the interests of the government
as a whole - the United States, the State, the People - are sys
tematically aligned with the prosecution.

When combined with

rulemaking authority in the evidence field, this systematic align
ment of interest raises a considerable potential for abuse. The con
cern, in short, is that the government will skew the rules of evidence
in such a way as to favor itself, as prosecutor. Indeed, this concern
is all the stronger given that the interests of criminal defendants
have never - certainly not today - been a cause with great polit
ical popularity.236
The beauty of a conception of the right to present witnesses
rooted in notions of equality is that it may serve as a powerful anti
dote to the problem of self-dealing while, at the same time, avoid
ing the prospect of tearing apart the core institutional arrangements
of the modem criminal system. An equality-based view would hold
that courts should regard with great suspicion those instances in
which the government denies certain kinds of testimony to the de
fense but permits itself to use the same when the testimony happens
to help the government's own case as prosecutor. By contrast,
236. Similar concern arises even when the maker of evidence rules is not a politically
accountable legislature but, instead, a common law court. As one commentator observes:
Judges and prosecutors are often viewed as team players in the criminal justice arena.
Many judges are former prosecutors, and their evidentiary rulings are sometimes per
ceived to favor the government over the defense. Defendants and defense attorneys
object that, despite the Bill of Rights, the presumption of innocence, and other legal
protections afforded criminal defendants, the deck is too often stacked against the de
fense. The fact that state court judges, who handle the bulk of criminal cases, are elected
by a population increasingly vocal about the need to fight crime contributes to the per
ception that judges are closer to prosecutors than defendants.
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Ex
panding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 199, 200 (1997).
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when the government denies a particular type of evidence not only
to the defense but also to itself, that stance is an exceedingly power
ful indication that the government genuinely regards the particular
categorical rule of exclusion as serving a compelling interest - one
beyond that of simply advantaging itself as prosecutor.237 For even
handed rules, then, ordinary rationality review should suffice.

a. Institutional Capabilities and the Legitimacy of the Trial Pro
cess. An equality-based view would enable the law to make use of
the institutional advantages of the legislative process as a source of
evidence reform, without the concomitant risk that the govern
ment's self-interest

will

trample upon criminal defendants.

As

Richard Posner has emphasized with respect to constitutional adju
dication generally, many disputes presently cast in terms of consti
tutional doctrine turn, in significant part, upon complicated
empirical judgments about non-legal matters - judgments that
courts are not well-equipped institutionally to make.238 In the area
of evidence disputes, the comparative advantage of legislatures in
the making of empirical judgments is especially pronounced with
regard to the cutting-edge varieties of witness testimony likely to
arise in the twenty-first century. The key is to harness the ability of
legislative bodies to identify and cull through information from the
pertinent body of expertise - frequently, science. The role of the
right to present witnesses should be to structure those proceedings
to ensure that whatever rule the government selects for itself also

will

apply to defendants, absent a compelling justification other-

237. As I explain momentarily, see infra section 11.C.1.b, I take this insight from remarks
of Akhi1 Amar - albeit directed to a different aspect of the Compulsory Process Clause.
Outside the realm of evidence law, Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have advanced a similar
argument to support the constitutionality of community policing measures, such as gang
loitering laws designed to reduce crime in predominantly African-American inner-city com
munities. As they explain:
The uniformly relentless scrutiny (toward criminal law enforcement] associated with the
modem [constitutional doctrine] rests on a presumption that communities never share in
the burdens of law-enforcement techniques that restrict the liberty of African-Ameri
cans. That assumption made sense before the 1960's civil rights revolution, but makes
much less sense today, given the political strength of African-Americans and their own
concern to free themselves from the ravages of inner-city crime. So instead of subjecting
all law-enforcement techniques to searching scrutiny, courts should now ask whether the
community itself is sharing in the burden that a particular law imposes on individual
freedom. If it is, the court should presume that that law does not violate individual
rights.
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEo. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998) (emphasis added).
238. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 21-22
(1998).
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In this manner, institutional arrangements may reinforce,

rather than threaten, constitutional rights.239
This institutional point is not just a pragmatic one. It is inti
mately related, as well, to the role of evidence law and the Constitu
tion as part of the larger panoply of legal rules that legitimize the
results of criminal trials in the eyes of the public.240 When a crimi
nal defendant is unable to use evidence that might call into question
her guilt, the legitimacy of the trial is undoubtedly reduced. The
problem

of legitimacy,

however,

is

not

so

simple

or

one

dimensional. Longstanding evidence rules of the sort canvassed
earlier241 routinely keep out witness testimony offered by the de
fense that might well be outcome determinative in a given criminal
trial. To say that the social legitimacy of the trial process depends
upon the defendant being able to put on whatever evidence she
thinks might raise a reasonable doubt about her guilt is, again, to
run headlong into the floodgates problem.
239. This institutional point relates, as well, to the connection between the right to pres
ent witnesses - as applied to witness testimony that draws upon scientific innovations - and
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
{1993). There, construing Rule 702, the Court famously rejected the proposition that the
admissibility of expert scientific testimony turns exclusively upon the general acceptance of
the scientific technique used by the expert See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
Concurring in Scheffer, Justice Kennedy observed that the per se rule against polygraph
evidence upheld in that case is in tension with the general thrust of Daubert. See United
States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1269 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That is true, insofar
as Daubert posits an exacting case-by-case evaluation of the support for expert scientific testi
mony - albeit based upon an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, not upon any
constitutional imperative. See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1269 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ac
knowledging Daubert's lack of constitutional status). At a deeper level, however, the Court's
current analytical framework for the right to present witnesses actually replicates the institu
tional weaknesses of Daubert. As numerous observers have noted, Daubert places the fed
eral courts in the awkward position of sitting in judgment over heated disputes concerning
matters on the cutting edge of science. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (panel op. by Kozinski, J., on remand); Brian Leiter, The
Epistemology ofAdmissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy ofScience Would Not Make for
Good Philosophy ofEvidence, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 815. As applied to expert scientific
testimony such as that involved in Scheffer, the Court's "arbitrary or disproportionate" stan
dard for the right to present witnesses has the distinct potential to entail the same sort of
second-guessing of other institutions' determinations of reliability. That is, perhaps, not quite
so troubling when the rulemaking institution consists of some other court, acting pursuant to
common law powers. It is much more awkward, as an institutional matter, when the
rulemaking entity is - at least by comparison - better positioned to cull through the scien
tific debate.
240. The leading exposition of the role of evidence law in the legitimation of outcomes at
trial remains Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accepta
bility of Verdicts, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 1357 (1985). For a provocative earlier comparison of the
trial process and the performing of a play for an audience, see Milner S. Ball, The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv.
81 (1975).
241. See supra section I.C.2.
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The legitimacy of the trial process in the eyes of the body politic
surely goes beyond the question of whose ox is gored by a particu
lar evidence rule in a given instance. Legitimacy depends at least as
much upon a social consensus,

dispute,

in advance of any particular evidence

concerning the appropriate institutional framework for the

formulation of evidence rules and the appropriate substantive re
strictions upon the rulemaking institutions. That is among the most
significant lessons of the Legal Process movement, which takes as
its major enterprise the legitimation of legal outcomes in the face of
social diversity and disagreement.242 To say that the rules of evi
dence generally must treat defendants as they treat prosecutors as an equality-based reading would hold - is to tie the legitimacy
of the criminal trial to deeply-ingrained notions of fairness.
The point is even stronger in modem times, when evidence rules
increasingly are the products of the democratic process and not
merely the output of common law courts acting subject to a legisla
tive override. When a rule treats equally prosecutors and defend
ants, there is little reason to believe that the political process
somehow is picking on defendants as part of a get-tough-with-crime
bandwagon. Rather, legitimacy is a consideration that cuts in a
number of different directions, particularly when controversial new
forms of testimony on the cutting edge of science are concerned. In
that context particularly, there is a considerable downside to the
of witness testimony that has been, say, hypnotically

admission

enhanced or that discusses the results of a polygraph examination:
namely, a lingering suspicion by external observers that the out
come at trial - whether a conviction, an acquittal, or simply a hung
jury - rests upon evidence that is akin to a Ouija board. The exist
ence of an evenhanded rule to exclude such evidence stands as a
powerful indication that society really does believe that the legiti
macy of trials would be damaged more by the admission of the dis
puted type of witness testimony - whether by a prosecutor or a
defendant - than it would be by its exclusion. It is eminently the
role of public institutions to make precisely these sorts of decisions.
Indeed, there is no reason to think - much less to compel constitu
tionally - that the various jurisdictions within this country neces
sarily

will

address the same problem in the same way. A diversity

of policy views is entirely appropriate when the type of testimony in
question is itself hotly disputed.
242. A classic statement of this enterprise appears in HENRY M. HART, JR. & .ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS

IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

3-4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., rev. ed. 1994).
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Recognition of the relationship

between the right to present witnesses and institutional structure
also serves to clarify a lingering point of doctrinal uncertainty con
cerning the source of the right itself. Neither the Supreme Court
nor modem commentators draw upon the Compulsory Process
Clause alone to support their view of the right as an entitlement to
exceptions. In its most detailed effort to pinpoint the source of the
right, the Court in Rock also referred to the Due Process Clause.243
Likewise, in speaking to the right in passing within a broader dis
cussion of the Sixth Amendment, Akhil Amar contends that courts
should understand the Compulsory Process Clause to provide
equality of process with regard to witness compulsion but that
courts nonetheless are correct to recognize a free-standing constitu
tional entitlement for the defense to admit witness testimony based
upon "a more general Sixth Amendment and due process test of
innocence protection and truth-seeking."244 Robert Clinton simi
larly invokes the Due Process Clause in support of his balancing
test.24s
There is much confusion here, as a matter both of precedent and
of first principles:

i. Precedent.

As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court needed to

invoke notions of fundamental fairness implicit in the guarantee of
due process in order to apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights to
the states.246 In this way, the Due Process Clause served simply 
and quite properly - as a vehicle of incorporation in the Court's
earliest cases on the right to present witnesses. Insofar as the Court
relied upon due process exclusively in

Chambers,

the Court did so

simply because of the peculiar manner in which the constitutional
claim in the case was litigated below.247 That does not demonstrate,
243. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948)).
244. AMAR, supra note 15, at 136 & n.213 (citing Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra
note 13, at 133-36, 156-57, 159, for the proposition that, "unless the evidence is so unreliable,
in the context of other evidence in the case, that it cannot properly be assessed by the jury
and the public, a defendant should be able to get it in"). Westen himself, to his credit, argues
for a more focused inquiry based upon the Compulsory Process Clause specifically. See
Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 181.

245. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 803-05.
246. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
247. As Westen explains:
[Chambers] made no constitutional objections until he moved, after the jury returned
the verdict, for a new trial on the ground that the exclusion of his evidence denied him a
fair trial under the due process clause. . . . [T]he [Supreme] Court seems to have as
sumed that the only constitutional question properly before it rested on due process,
rather than on Chambers' newly advanced confrontation and compulsory process argu
ments, and that this due process claim was based on the cumulative effect of the trial
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however, that the Compulsory Process Clause somehow means
something different when combined with the Due Process Clause,
and the Court's implicit suggestion to that effect in

Rock is

a mis

reading of precedent. Notions of fundamental fairness are relevant
to impose upon the states the right to present witnesses implicit in
the Compulsory Process Clause, not somehow to alter the content
of that guarantee. That, of course, is what incorporation means in
the criminal context: defendants get rights vis-a-vis the states that
the Bill of Rights provides against the federal government - noth
ing less, but also nothing more.
Apart from precedent, efforts to draw an exception-based view
from the Due Process Clause are mistaken in principle, and the ex
planation of that mistake itself relates to the structural insights set
out above. I :first consider the point by reference to academic com
mentary and then turn to an illustrative sampling of due process
case law.

ii. The Academic Debate.

Among commentators, Akhil Amar's

effort to invoke the Due Process Clause is the most telling, as he
seeks to distinguish between a decidedly equality-based view of wit
ness compulsion and an exception-based view of witness admissibil
ity. Amar starts from the right premise when he speaks of the
literal compulsion of witnesses. In rhetoric closely akin to that
deployed here, he states that "when a government chooses to deny
itself a certain [witness] coercion technique . . . or even all coercion
against certain highly valued social relationships of intimacy and
trust . . . this self-denial proves that the government really does see
a 'compelling interest' against compulsion."248 Indeed, \vith regard
to witness compulsion, Amar appears entirely willing to embrace a
categorical approach. There does not seem room, in his view, for
the courts to engage in a case-specific examination to ascertain
whether the Constitution requires the use of a given compulsion
technique - one that the government has "chos[en] to deny itself"
- even when the particular witness sought by the defense might
well be highly exculpatory. When he comes to the admissibility of
witness testimony, however, Amar nonetheless invokes due process
to support an exception-based view.249
court's rulings [excluding exculpatory hearsay statements and preventing the defense
from recalling the declarant to the stand) taken together rather than separately.
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 607 n.108.
248. AMAR, supra note 15, at 133.
249. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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There are two related problems here. Amar's telling reference
to "compelling interest[s]" implies that strict scrutiny, when applied
by a reviewing court, operates as a way to reconstruct the ordinary
rulemaking process with special weight attached to the protection
of constitutional rights - weight that the process otherwise might
be thought disinclined to give to criminal defendants, among other
persons afforded special constitutional protection. The same rea
soning would suggest, however, that a rulemaking process

supple

mented by a constitutional demand for equal treatment would not be
in need of judicial reconstruction. Rather, by Amar's own reason
ing, a rulemaking process so constrained would determine what in
terests are compelling enough to warrant the exclusion of evidence
per se and, with the government bound no less than defendants,
there would be no structural reason to regard that determination as
constitutionally suspect.
More broadly, Amar�s suggestion that at least some (unspeci
fied) evidence rules might be unconstitutional under his general
"due process test of innocence protection and truth-seeking" is a
contention curiously at odds with his overall approach to constitu
tional interpretation - an approach that is much in keeping with
my effort here to connect structure and rights. Speaking outside of
the criminal context to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as a
whole, Amar has presented a powerful argument that constitutional
scholars have long neglected the structural dimensions of the Bill.
He provocatively contends that one ought to understand the Bill of
Rights not so much as a series of measures to protect political mi
norities but, instead, as provisions that actually reinforce the
structural, and decidedly majoritarian, themes of the original Con
stitution - in essence, as a way to deploy popular sovereignty as a

constraint upon the new national government.250 All of this, if any

thing, reinforces the attractiveness of an equality-based view of the
right to present witnesses, as it would place in the hands of
rulemaking institutions the :flexibility to adapt to changing condi
tions with regard to evidence issues, but would insist that they do
unto the government itself, as prosecutor, what they would do unto
criminal defendants. Amar's invocation of the Due Process Clause
thus, I submit, is an error even on his own terms.
250. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1132 ("[I]ndividual and minority rights did constitute a
motif of the Bill of Rights - but not the sole, or even the dominant, motif. A close look at
the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights . . . . The main
thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational structure, but to deploy it; not to im
pede popular majorities, but to empower them.").
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Apart from aca

demic commentary, the structural insights outlined earlier also dis
tinguish an equality-based view of the right to present witnesses
from other aspects of criminal procedure that advantage defendants
specifically vis-a-vis the prosecution pursuant to a due process man
date.251 As I explain by way of two leading examples, the cases in
this line seek to address what are, at bottom, structural problems
arising from the multiple roles that the government plays in the
criminal process and the concomitant potential for self-dealing. For
purposes of due process, the point is not to mandate equal treat
ment or unequal treatment favoring the defense but, rather, to ad
dress the structural problems inherent in a government monopoly
upon law making and criminal enforcement. That unequal treat
ment is required by due process in some areas is not a command for
it to be mandated blindly with respect to the admissibility of witness
testimony as well. For the reasons outlined earlier, an equality
based view of the right to present witnesses addresses the same
structural concerns, precisely by imposing a constitutional demand
for equal treatment.
Two examples illustrate the point: The Supreme Court, in In re
Winship, held that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution
in a proceeding properly characterized as criminal in nature to
prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.252 This
standard of proof plainly tilts the playing field substantially in favor
of criminal defendants, as compared to the usual preponderance
standard in civil litigation. In

Winship,

however, the question was

not so much which standard of proof should govern in criminal
cases. The Court easily showed that a demand for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal matters "dates at least from our early
years as a Nation" - indeed, that "[t]he 'demand for a higher de
gree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from
ancient times.' "253
The real concern, instead, turned upon the systematic incentive
of the government, in its capacity as law maker, to define narrowly
what constitutes a "criminal" proceeding, in an effort to exclude
matters like the juvenile delinquency proceeding at issue in

Winship

251. See generally Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 {1983) (noting in dictum
that "the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned
review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules").
252. In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
253. 397 U.S. at 361 (quoting CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 321, at 681 (1954)).
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itself.254 A narrow construction of the "criminal" category by the
government as law maker would enable the government, as prose
cutor, to avoid not just the elevated standard of proof associated for
centuries therewith but also the panoply of other constitutional pro
tections - the rights to counsel, to confrontation and, for that mat
ter, to present witnesses - afforded by the Sixth Amendment
specifically for criminal trials.255 The due process imperative in

Winship

thus serves to constrain the government from self-dealing

by positing an independent judicial role to ascertain whether the
proceeding at issue is properly classified as "criminal." There is
considerably less need for a similar stance with regard to the admis
sion of witness testimony, at least when the rulemak.ing process it
self would operate under a demand for equal treatment.
Another conspicuously unequal aspect of criminal procedure
mandated by the Due Process Clause consists of the obligation of
prosecutors, under

Brady

v.

Maryland,

to disclose to defendants

"favorable" evidence, even though defendants are under no analo
gous obligation to bring to the attention of prosecutors unfavorable
evidence.256 As such, Brady is a classic example in which even
handedness does not pass constitutional muster in the criminal con
text.

Here again, however, the explanation for a constitutional

mandate systematically to favor the defense stems from the struc
tural features of the criminal system: specifically, the government's
role as the administrator of both the courts and the prosecutor's
office. As a result, unlike attorneys for civil litigants or for criminal
defendants, prosecutors have an obligation beyond that of zealous
advocacy. As Barbara Babcock has explained, the central insight
behind

Brady

consists of the notion that prosecutors, as agents of

the same government that administers the court system itself,
should not be able to assert the defendant's guilt while aware of
information, unknown to the defense, that tends to suggest inno-

254. Under New York law at the time, the determination of juvenile "delinquency"
turned upon a finding that the particular juvenile in question had engaged in "an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult" 397 U.S. at 359.
255. The civil-criminal distinction is the subject of considerable academic interest and
ongoing debate. For my synopsis of the recent literature, see Nagareda, supra note 133, at
1128.
256. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

The Court itself has recognized that
the Compulsory Process Clause is at least tangentially related to Brady in that the prosecu
tion is obligated to issue compulsory process only to those witnesses whose testimony is "ma
terial" to the defense - the same standard that governs the government's obligation to
disclose favorable evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-68

(1982).
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cence.257 Here, too, inequality - if one can call it that - is neces
sary to constrain self-dealing by the government in pre-trial
information gathering in a way that is not needed for rules gov
erning the admission of witness testimony, at least not when supple
mented by a demand that those rules themselves accord equal
treatment.
In short, due process lends no support to an exception-based
view of the right to present witnesses;

if anything, it reinforces the

plausibility of an equality-based view.

2. Exceptions and Equality Elsewhere
In the context of constitutional law as a whole, the proposition
that courts should understand the right to present witnesses as a
right to equal treatment is neither novel nor momentous. Such a
view, instead, starts to look quite familiar when one considers de
velopments in two other constitutional contexts that,

if

anything,

are even more sensitive and socially contentious than the rights of
criminal defendants: specifically, race and religion.25s
Race is the more straightforward illustration, as the constitu
tional provision in question - the Equal Protection Clause259 speaks explicitly in terms of equal treatment. Thus, in Washington
v. Davis,260 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a
law that had a disparate impact upon African Americans. If any
thing, disparate impact - a claim that necessarily goes to the disad
vantageous effects of the law upon many persons of a particular
race - is, in some ways, considerably more troubling than an iso
lated application that disadvantages a single individual. The line
drawn by the Court between laws of general applicability (which do
not trigger strict scrutiny, even upon a showing of disparate impact)
257. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effec
tive Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1131, 1134-35 (1982) (emphasizing the Court's
reference in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), to the distinctive role of the
prosecutor as " 'the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."').
258. Outside the realm of individual rights, there are other contexts in which the Court
has understood constitutional provisions to focus upon equal treatment. Thus, under the so
called Dormant Co=erce Clause, the Court "treats laws that facially discriminate against
interstate co=erce and laws that are 'protectionist' in purpose or practical effect as 'virtu
ally per se invalid."' GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 297.
259. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
260. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of test to measure the reading com
prehension, vocabulary, and verbal skills among applicants to police force). In this respect,
the Equal Protection Clause differs fundamentally from federal statutes, such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, understood to permit actions for disparate impact. See 426 U.S.
at 238-39.
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and laws that classify by race (which generally

will

be upheld only

upon the showing of a compelling governmental interest)261 is
analogous to the line suggested here. In fact, the justification of
fered by the Court - the fear that the Equal Protection Clause
otherwise would run rampant through many familiar government
programs that might have a disparate impact262 - is simply the an
alogue, in the race context, of the floodgates problem lurking be
hind the

Scheffer

Court's effort to cabin the right to present

witnesses.
The religion context is more controversial, though even more
illuminating for present purposes. The controversy stems, in large
part, from the lack of any explicit reference to notions of equality
on the face of the Free Exercise Clause. One might take the decla
ration that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise" of religion as embodying a constitutional

requirement for

exceptions from generally applicable laws.263 The historical context
of the Clause, too, remains hotly debated.264
In

Employment Division v. Smith, 265 the

Court nonetheless de

parted dramatically from its previous exception-based view of the
Clause, regarding the general applicability of an Oregon criminal
prohibition upon the drug peyote to be essentially conclusive in
favor of its constitutionality. The comparison with Smith is illumi
nating, given that several other states actually had recognized an
exception for religious exercise in their comparable criminal stat
utes concerning peyote.266 The religious practitioners in Smith much like the criminal defendants in both

Rock

and

Scheffer

-

happened to have the very considerable misfortune to live in a ju
risdiction that did not recognize exceptions but, instead, took a cat
egorical view. In effect, Oregon had adopted a per se rule
criminalizing peyote, much as Arkansas had excluded hypnotically261.

See Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).

262. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 ("A rule that a statute designed to serve
neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to
the more affluent white.").
263. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1115 (contending that this reading "is the more
obvious and literal meaning" of the constitutional language (italics omitted)).
264. Compare, e.g., McConnell, supra note 181 (discussing historical support for an
exception-based view of the Clause) with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992) (disput
ing McConnell's account).
265. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
266.

See 494 U.S.

at 912 n.5 (Blackmun,

J.,

dissenting).
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enhanced testimony and the President had barred in courts martial
expert testimony based upon polygraph examinations. In Smith,
too, the Court referred at some length to the floodgates problem267
as well as to the institutional inappropriateness of placing the judici
ary in the position of "determin[ing] the place of a particular belief
in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim. "268 The latter
concern stands as the rough analogue to the institutional considera
tions raised earlier with respect to the second-guessing of evidence
rules that govern complex, cutting-edge forms of witness
testimony.269
Not surprisingly, Smith unleashed a torrent of academic com
mentary,270 and a grand synthesis of that debate is well beyond my
enterprise here. Regardless of whether one is a Smith-lover, a
Smith-hater, or neither, it should be common ground that a crucial
feature of the present context makes an equality-based view of the
right to present witnesses markedly more palatable than the
equivalent view of the Free Exercise Clause. In the free exercise
context, a generally applicable law is one that typically will have
little bite upon most of the body politic. Simply as a political mat
ter, the major reason why there are criminal prohibitions upon pe
yote is that the vast majority of people do not regard that substance
as part of religious exercise or, for that matter, of any legitimate
activity. As Michael McConnell starkly observes:
In a world in which some [religious] beliefs are more prominent than
others, the political branches will inevitably be more selectively sensi
tive toward religious injuries. Laws that impinge upon the religious
practices of larger or more prominent faiths will be noticed and reme
died. When the laws impinge upon the practice of smaller groups,
legislators will not even notice, and may not care even if they do
notice.271

For the right to present witnesses, by contrast, insistence upon
general applicability really does have bite in the sense that it genu267. See 494 U.S. at 888-89; see also 494 U.S. at 885 ("To make an individual's obligation
to obey [a generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his
beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' . . . - contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense." (footnote and citation omitted)).
268. 494 U.S. at 887.
269. See supra section II.C.1.
270. For a mere smattering of the rancor over Smith, see supra note 21. On the unsuc
cessful effort by Congress to switch back to an exception-based view, see supra note 22.
271. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1136. Even the Court in Smith acknowledged that
"[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in." Smith, 494
U.S. at 890.
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inely constrains the prosecution. It means that the prosecution can
not admit the specified form of testimony, even though in some
cases - perhaps many - hypnotically-enhanced testimony, poly
graph results, or an out-of-court statement contrary to the declar
ant's penal interest may be exceedingly helpful to the prosecution's
case. Under such conditions, there is considerably less reason to
think that the rulemaker somehow is hostile to, or simply unaware
of, the interests of criminal defendants and all the more reason to
think that the rule actually amounts to a thoughtful resolution not necessarily the only one that might be made - of a contested
question of admissibility.
The comparison with the Court's free exercise cases since Smith
sheds further light upon the constitutional demand for evenhanded
ness. After Smith, the Court has not focused blindly upon general
applicability, without regard to the real-world effects of a given law.
Thus, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi
aleah, 212 the Court struck down a prohibition upon animal sacrifice
that, though ostensibly of general applicability, was "drafted with
care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacri
fice. "273 The upshot is that one should not focus simply upon gen
eral applicability on the face of the law itself, without regard to
whether that feature of the law makes for evenhandedness in prac
tical terms or is merely the product of artful draftsmanship. As I
note by way of example in Part ill,274 this is a lesson that should
carry over to a demand for evenhandedness under the auspices of
the right to present witnesses.
D.

Protecting Defendants in Practical Terms

It is not necessary to take an idyllic view of the rulemaking pro
cess in order to regard the right to present witnesses as a right to
equal treatment. To the contrary, as I discuss here, the more skepti
cal one is that rulemakers - whether legislators or common law
judges - will consider seriously the interests of criminal defend
ants, the more attractive an equality-based view becomes. Wholly
apart from constitutional doctrine, it surely is worthwhile to con
sider the practical effects of a given constitutional standard over
272. 508 U.S. 520

(1993).

273. 508 U.S. at 543. See also SOS U.S. at 536
killings of animals except for religious sacrifice.").

("The [prohibition] excludes almost all

274. See infra section ill.B.2 (analyzing Rule 412 as a rule that is, at least arguably, gener
ally applicable on its face but that restricts evidence the admission of which ouly defendants
are likely to seek).
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another. I contend here that concern for the protection of criminal
defendants in practical terms tends to point in favor of the switch
that I advocate to an equality-based view. At the very least, it is not
possible to argue for the current exception-based view on the
ground that it is the more protective of criminal defendants as a
whole.
There are four options that a maker of evidence rules realisti
cally might wish to pursue with regard to a controversial type of
witness testimony, the admission of which - all readily would
agree - should not be absolutely mandated:
Option 1: A discriminatory rule that categorically bars the ad
mission of the specified type of testimony when offered by the de
fense but that leaves open the prospect for its admission, on a case
by-case basis, when offered by the prosecution.
Option 2: An evenhanded, categorical rule that bars the admis
. sion of the specified type of testimony when offered by either side.
Option

3:

A rule that leaves open the prospect for admission of

the specified type of testimony for either side, on a case-by-case
basis.
Option

4:

A rule that categorically bars the admission of the

specified type of testimony when offered by the prosecution but
that leaves open the prospect for its admission, on a case-by-case
basis, when offered by the defense. (One might call this a reverse
discrimination rule, insofar as it systematically would favor the de
fense over the prosecution, rather than vice versa as in Option 1.)
It is undoubtedly true that, if defendants could write the evi
dence rules, they would opt uniformly for Option 4 - the reverse
discrimination rule - for it, in practical terms, would categorically
restrict the prosecution from admitting the disputed type of witness
testimony

if it incriminated

a particular defendant but would leave

the defense free to argue for admission

if the testimony turned

out

to be exculpatory in a given instance. But defendants do not write,
and have never written, the evidence rules; legislatures and com
mon law courts do. The upshot of the Supreme Court's decisions
on the right to present witnesses is to forbid rulemakers from
choosing either Option 1 or Option 2, at least absent a compelling
justification. Indeed, Option 1 is completely off the table, as even
an equality-based view would strike it down.

Moreover, under

either my view or that of the current Court, Options

3

and

4

are

equally permissible as a constitutional matter, as either would leave
open the prospect that the disputed type of witness testimony may
be admitted for the defense on a case-by-case basis.
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The practical question is: Are defendants as a whole better off
under the current constitutional regime that leaves open their de
sired Option 4, also permits Option 3, and essentially forbids Op
tion 2? Might defendants as a whole actually be better off under an
equality-based view that would leave open Options 2, 3, and 4?
There is reason to think so - at the very least, reason to doubt that
one credibly can defend the current constitutional regime on the
ground of its practical effect upon defendants generally.
A world in which rulemakers could not bind both prosecutors
and defendants to categorical rules for the exclusion of controver
sial forms of witness testimony might well devolve into a world in
which categorical rules are never enacted in the first place. In
particular,

if

every categorical rule were to remain subject to

constitutionally-mandated exceptions for defendants in particular
cases, a rulemaker may well be disinclined to enact categorical rules
that are, in many - for some rules, most - of their applications,
highly protective of criminal defendants.275 The rulemaker may
opt, instead, for an evenhanded, case-by-case approach.
To translate the point to the framework used here: If the enact
ment of Option 2 will necessarily amount in practice to Option 4

-

as it would under current law - the rulemaker might not pursue
Option 2 at all. Instead, it might choose Option 3. If anything, cur
rent law pushes rulemakers in that direction. In contrast to its ad
hoc invalidations of categorical rules, the Supreme Court has not
imposed any substantial constitutional limitations upon the prerog
ative of rulemakers to select a case-by-case approach to the admis
sion of witness testimony in lieu of a categorical approach.276
275. For defendants, the protective applications of a categorical rule are hardly trivial. To
take one telling illustration, drawn from the circumstances in Rock: The refusal of a
rulemaker to prohibit categorically all hypnotically-enhanced testimony would be profoundly
harmful to many defendants, and not just because they would be put to the burden of litigat
ing the admissibility of such evidence when offered by the prosecution. The most trouble
some cases of prosecution efforts to admit hypnotically-enhanced testimony center upon
allegations of sexual abuse - an area that co=entators have long regarded as especially
susceptible to erroneous convictions and, even more importantly, one in which judges in
charge of making case-by-case admissibility determinations might be most tempted to afford
prosecutors more leeway than defendants.
For an overview of the recent literature on testimony in sexual abuse trials, see Richard
A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction ofRepressed Memory, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 653
{1997). See also id. at 663 {identifying hypnosis as among the "specific techniques through
which recovered memory therapists first create and then validate pseudomemories of
abuse").
276. In the context of cases involving incriminating identification testimony, the Court
has held that the Due Process Clause places an outer limit upon the ability of prosecutors to
offer evidence that is extremely unreliable in the sense of creating "a very substantial likeli
hood of irreparable misidentification." See Si=ons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
{1968). This residual due process limitation "is a minimal one: only the most tendentious
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The balancing of Option 2 versus Option 3, in terms o� their
practical impact upon defendants as a whole, is likely to turn upon
the particular type of testimony in question. When the testimony is
such that it tends to be offered more frequently as incriminatory
evidence by the prosecution, defendants as a whole would be better
off under an evenhanded, categorical bar (Option 2) than they
would be if they retained the opportunity to argue on a case-by
case basis for admission of the same type of testimony in those few
instances in which it helps the defense (Option 3). For other types
of witness testimony, the balance may tip the other way, again,
when one considers the effects upon all defendants. I do not pur
port to discern an answer to the balancing question that would ap
ply uniformly to all types of disputed witness testimony. Indeed, no
answer appears possible. Even empirical research confined to the
impact of a given evidence rule would be fraught with peril, for the
reported cases would not include those instances where the rule especially, an evenhanded, case-by-case rule - leads defendants or
prosecutors to plea bargain rather than to take their chances with
the admissibility issue at trial. For present purposes, nonetheless,
there are two crucial observations that one can make with confi
dence, both of which concern the practical consequences of the
competing constitutional regimes at issue here.
First, it is not possible to defend the current exception-based
view of the right to present witnesses on the ground that it makes
defendants as a whole better off. If anything, there is strong reason
to doubt that the current regime does so - at the very least, that it
does so generally - insofar as it gives rulemakers a disincentive to
enact categorical exclusionary rules that, in many instances, will be
highly protective of defendants.
Second, there is a significant respect in which an evenhanded,
case-by-case approach is always less desirable than a categorical ap
proach from the standpoint of defendants. In fact, it is a feature
that should be of special concern to those who would take the most
skeptical view of the seriousness with which the criminal system re
gards defendants. A system in which both rulemakers and ruleand inherently dubious items of [identification] evidence are deemed to run afoul of the due
process clause." Westen, Future of Confrontation, supra note 218, at 1190; see also id. ("The
due process clause permits the prosecution to introduce any item of incriminating evidence it
wishes, unless the evidence is too unreliable for a jury to evaluate rationally.").
Even if extended beyond the context of identification testimony, such a limitation plainly
would not prevent an evidence rulemaker from taking the position that a particular contro
versial form of evidence - that is, one that at least some observers regard as reliable, as is
true for polygraph evidence and hypnotically-enhanced testimony - may be admissible for
the prosecution on a case-by-case basis.
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applying judges - so a skeptic would posit - are neglectful of de
fendants' interests would be one that would find highly attractive a
regime of case-by-case admissibility rulings. That way, it would be
all the easier to tilt the playing field for prosecutors and against
defendants through a series of particularized rulings, without hav
ing to say so in any overt or general manner, such as would more
quickly - and properly - gamer the attention of the public. A
system of case-by-case rulings, moreover, would enhance the ability
of prosecutors to exercise their discretion to bring to the fore the
strongest cases in order to establish favorable precedents on the ad
missibility issue. It is very hard to imagine that defendants as a
whole would consider themselves better off in such a world. Yet,
that is the world that an exception-based view creates in practical
terms.
ffi.

IMPLICATIONS

Having set forward the case to reconceive the right to present
witnesses as a right of equal treatment, I briefly discuss here the
implications of that view for the Court's existing case law and for
features of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A.

The Case Law Reconsidered

An equality-based view would hold that the early cases concern

ing discriminatory evidence rules -

Ferguson

and

Washington

were decided correctly, but for the wrong reasons.

-

As Justice

Harlan counseled in his Washington concurrence,277 the Court
should have focused upon the discriminatory structure of the rules,
not upon a free-standing inquiry into arbitrariness. One easily may
dispose of the Court's two most recent cases as well: The outcome
in

Rock

was wrong. Specifically, the per se rule against hypnoti

cally-enhanced testimony struck down in that case was evenhanded,
and that stance - in the face of ongoing controversy over the ef
fects of hypnosis - does not
rationality. By contrast,

run

afoul of constitutional review for

Scheffer was right in its result, because the

per se rule against polygraph evidence is, in relevant respects, iden
tical to the rule in

Rock.

The Court's reasoning in

Scheffer,

how

ever, is a serious disappointment, for it makes none of the right
analytical points.
277. See supra note 60. Justice Harlan based his view on the Due Process Clause,
whereas I rely upon the Compulsory Process Clause and use the Due Process Clause solely as
a vehicle of incorporation.
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which concerned

Mississippi's refusal to admit statements against penal interest as an
exception to the rule against hearsay.

The question there was

whether the defense could admit the testimony of third-party wit
nesses, prepared to recount three out-of-court confessions of a man
other than the defendant to the shooting of a police officer.278 As I
explain, the Court erred in striking down Mississippi's hearsay rule,
at least on the facts presented in

Chambers itself.279

There is, how

ever, reason to doubt the constitutionality of such a rule in other
situations.
On its face, at least, the rule in

Chambers was as evenhanded as

one could imagine: Statements against penal interest constituted
inadmissible hearsay, whether offered by the prosecution or the de
fense. Upon a determination that the rule is evenhanded, the only
question under an equality-based view would be whether there ex
ists a rational basis for treating statements against penal interest
differently from statements against pecuniary interest, which Mis
sissippi was prepared to admit - again, for both sides - as an
exception to the rule against hearsay. Although the question is not
an easy one - and I would not distinguish between the two sorts of
statements as a policy matter - the Court ultimately would have
been hard pressed to deem the state irrational for considering state
ments against penal interest to carry somewhat greater risks of
fabrication.
278. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
279. Westen contends that Chambers is rightly decided, because it would have been con
stitutionally permissible to admit an out-of-court statement against penal interest as evidence
for the prosecution - specifically, that the statement would have been sufficiently reliable to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even if the prosecution had not called the declarant as a
witness at trial. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 155 (noting that Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), holds "that a spontaneous declaration against penal interest,
corroborated by independent evidence and made without any apparent motive to mislead,
could be used against the accused, because its inherent reliability made cross-examination
unnecessary"). This premise is accurate as a description of the Court's confrontation case
law. Westen uses it, however, to read Chambers as "stand(ing] for the proposition that evi
dence that is sufficiently reliable by constitutional standards to be introduced 'against' the
accused is sufficiently reliable to be introduced 'in his favor."' Id. at 155.
The question, however, is not whether it would be constitutionally permissible for the
prosecution to admit the type of testimony in question, had it been inculpatory rather than
exculpatory. The right question, instead, is whether the system ofevidence roles at issue - in
Chambers, Mississippi evidence law - would have permitted the prosecution to admit the
disputed type of testimony, had it been inculpatory. It is plain that Mississippi law, at the
time, considered all statements against penal interest - even statements offered by the pros
ecution to incriminate the defendant (and the declarant, too) - to be inadmissible hearsay.
In other words, whatever the outer boundaries of the Constitution might be with regard to
statements against interest, Mississippi had chosen not to permit the prosecution to go to the
constitutional limit. Instead, the state had acted evenhandedly to bar statements against pe
nal interest, regardless of which side wished to admit them.
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People generally do not say things contrary to their interests un
less they are true.280 When the disputed out-of-court statements
implicate the declarant in crime, however, the picture becomes
murkier. The concern is that those sorts of statements may be, in a
sense,

too

contrary to the declarant's interest: They not only are

unlikely to be made but, given the seriousness of implicating one's
self in crime, may

-

if

made - be advanced for some ulterior

motive.
First, consider when the defense would want to admit state
ments against penal interest: when out-of-court statements incul
pate

the

declarant

in

crime

but

nonetheless

exculpate

the

defendant, there is a non-trivial concern that the defense may have
induced the declarant to fabricate the statement in an effort to sow
doubt about the defendant's guilt in the mind of the jury.281 Now,
consider when the prosecution would want to admit a statement
against penal interest:

if such a statement is inculpatory to both the

declarant and the defendant, the concern is that the declarant sim
ply was seeking to curry favor for herself with the prosecution by
implicating the defendant as well in criminal activity.282 In fact, one
does not have to rest upon broad generalizations to support the ra
tionality of the Mississippi rule: in

Chambers,

the declarant himself

took the position at trial, with some plausibility, that his earlier
statements identifying himself as the shooter were fabrications.283
Tb.ere was, in short, at least a rational basis to treat differently state
ments against penal interest - one that resonates with the facts of
Chambers itself.
280. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("The circumstantial guar
anty of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are
true.").
281. See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 804.06[5], at 804-56 (discussing need
for corroboration of this sort of statement); cf. infra section 111.B.1 (questioning whether it is
constitutionally permissible for the federal rules to insist upon special indicia of corrobora
tion where the statement exculpates but not when it inculpates the defendant).
282. See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 804.06[6][a], at 804-60 ("Since the
statements are made by someone subject to criminal prosecution, the possibility exists, espe
cially when the statement is made while the declarant is in police custody, that the declarant
sought immunity or hoped to be allowed to plead to a lesser crime in return for providing
help to the prosecution in obtaining a conviction.").
283. The declarant McDonald claimed that he had confessed to the shooting at the insti
gation of a local minister, who "had promised that he would not go to jail and that he would
share in the proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the [police]."
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 288 (1973). This is not to say that McDonald's ac
count necessarily was true. Rather, it is simply to note that the particular statements against
penal interest in Chambers hardly were outside the basic policy argument for the exclusion of
such evidence.
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In addition, apart from factual details, it would have been bi
zarre for the Supreme Court to deem irrational Mississippi's refusal
to admit statements against penal interest when the Court itself, in
the decades prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, had embraced
precisely the same view for purposes of federal criminal trials.284
Even among the various states, Mississippi's refusal to admit state
ments against penal interest was not anomalous; rather, it repre
sented the majority view at the time.2ss
It would be a mistake, however, to think that an equality-based
view of the right to present witnesses should look only to the face of
the particular rule in question. Rather, a variation on the situation
in

Chambers

illustrates the probity with which courts should apply

an equality-based view. The exclusion of statements against penal
interest would

not

be an evenhanded rule in some situations, and

the key to their recognition turns not upon speculation about the
rulemaker's subjective intent but, instead, upon examination of re
lated evidence rules. As I now explain, a court would not properly
characterize as evenhanded a rule of the sort in

Chambers

in cir

cumstances where it is possible to characterize the declarant of the
statement

against

penal

interest

as

a

coconspirator

of the

defendant.
When offered by the prosecution, out-of-court statements con
trary to the declarant's penal interest typically will implicate the de
clarant in the same crime for which the defendant herself is on trial.
As such, the declarant frequently will consist of someone the prose
cutor readily may label a coconspirator of the defendant.286 The
prosecution need not prove the existence of a conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt; indeed, the defense may have plausible grounds
to deny the existence of a conspiracy. For purposes of admissibility,
it is enough simply for the prosecutor to present the court with facts
284. See supra notes 75-77 (discussing the incongruity of the result in Chambers and the
Court's earlier decision in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), upholding the ex
clusion of exculpatory statements against penal interest in federal trials). Donnelly held sway
within the federal system until the current Rule 804(b)(3) supplanted it by permitting the
admission of all statements against interest. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299.
285.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Asser
tion, and Hearsay, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 323, 357 (1984) ("Almost all coconspirator state
286.

ments . . . assert or at least imply an insider's knowledge on the part of the declarant
concerning the [criminal] venture, and in other contexts this factor alone has brought [the
exception for statements against interest provided by] rule 804(b)(3) into play." (citation
omitted)); see also James Joseph Duane, The Trouble with United States v. Tellier: The Dan
gers ofHunting for Bootstrappers and Other Mythical Monsters, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 259
n.149 (1997) ("The overlap between the operation of these two hearsay exceptions is obvi
ously considerable.").
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from which a reasonable jury might infer, by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed.287
The significance of this point is that the prosecutor then will not
need to rely upon the hearsay exception for statements against in
terest. Rather, the law of evidence has long considered statements
by coconspirators of a party to be outside the rule against hearsay,
when offered against that party - at least where the statement is
made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."288
This is the position taken not only by the current Federal Rules of
Evidence,289 but also, more importantly, by Mississippi law at the
time of

Chambers.29°

The basic policy rationale is that an out-of

court statement made by a coconspirator of a party is tantamount
to a statement from that party herself, essentially on agency princi
ples.291 This rationale, in turn, explains why the exception is limited
to the admission of coconspirators' statements against that party.
The upshot is that the bar upon statements against penal interest in
would not be evenhanded where the declarant also is a
coconspirator, for the prosecution could use another hearsay excep

Chambers

tion to admit the statements (when incriminatory), whereas the de
fense could not (if the testimony were exculpatory).292
The feature of

Chambers itself that makes the application of the

Mississippi hearsay rules constitutionally permissible is that there
was no reason whatsoever to think that the declarant in that case
was a coconspirator of the defendant. By all appearances from the
Court's opinion, the two men were completely unconnected to one
another, save for their fateful presence in the same location at the
time of the disputed shooting. In those circumstances, Mississippi's
bar upon statements against penal interest is genuinely evenhanded
- and the Court's holding in

Chambers is in error - as the prose

cution could not have used the coconspirator exception to admit the
287. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
288. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E).
289. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E).
290. See McELROY, supra note 77, § 43, at 202.
291. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2) (removing coconspirators' statements from definition of
hearsay, along with a "party's own statement," statements by persons "authorized by the
party to make a statement concerning the subject," and statements by a "party's agent or
servant").
292. The federal rules avoid this problem by making an incriminatory statement admissi
ble for the prosecution under the coconspirator exception and an exculpatory statement ad
missible for the defense as a statement against interest. The federal hearsay exception for
statements against interest encompasses all statements against penal interest. See FED. R.
Evm. 804(b)(3). But cf. infra section III.B.1 (contending that it is unconstitutional for the
federal rules to prescribe a heightened standard of corroboration for exculpatory statements
against interest offered by criminal defendants).
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declarant's out-of-court statements, had they inculpated rather than
exculpated the defendant.
The major point is that a commitment to an equality-based view
does not counsel blind acceptance of evenhandedness on the face of
the disputed evidence rule. Rather, the inquiry is a probing and
subtle one. The significant attraction of such an approach, as com
pared to current law, lies in its institutional appropriateness. It puts
the reviewing court in the position not of second-guessing the
grounds upon which one might regard the disputed form of evi
dence as problematic but, instead, in the position of analyzing the
structure and relationship of the evidence rules at issue - a dis
tinctly lawyerly task, rather than one of an evidence policymaker.
B.

Equal Treatment and the Federal Rules of Evidence

It should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court hereto
fore has never invoked the right to present witnesses to strike down
the application of a federal evidence rule, as distinct from state evi
dence law. Given the Court's own involvement in the rulemaking
process at the federal level,293 it is unlikely that the Court would
give its imprimatur to any rule about which it had serious constitu
tional reservations. Wholly apart from the Court's involvement,
moreover, the federal rules typically afford criminal defendants
greater flexibility with regard to the admission of evidence, insofar
as they distinguish at all between defendants and prosecutors.
That, of course, is constitutionally permissible under either an
exception-based or an equality-based view. Thus, for example,
criminal defendants retain the option to place their own character
at issue, whereas the prosecution may use evidence of bad character
only in response to such a defense.294
There nonetheless are some significant features of the current
federal rules that systematically disadvantage defendants vis-a-vis
prosecutors and that are the product of legislative draftsmanship
independent from the Court itself. Comparison of these features
sheds light upon the application, advocated here, of a compelling
interest test to discriminatory evidence rules.
1.

Rule 804(b) (3)

The first example returns us to the hearsay exception for state
ments against interest. Unlike the Mississippi rule in
293. See supra note 178.
294. See FEo. R. EVID. 404(a).

Chambers,
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federal Rule 804(b)(3) exempts from the rule against hearsay a
statement that "so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . crimi
nal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true."
In order to avail themselves of this exception, litigants generally
would need to show only that it is possible for the fact finder to
consider the statement contrary to the declarant's interests295 hardly a difficult showing to make.
The last sentence of Rule 804(b)(3), however, places a substan
tial additional limitation upon the invocation of this exception by
criminal defendants: "A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not ad
missible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement."296 Whether this heightened stan
dard of corroboration directed specifically at exculpatory evidence
can survive strict scrutiny is open to considerable doubt. There cer
tainly is legitimate concern when the defense offers the out-of-court
statement of an unavailable declarant in an effort not only to incul
pate the declarant but also to exculpate the defendant. As noted
above with respect to

Chambers,

it would not be irrational for a

rulemaker to exclude statements against penal interest when of
fered either by the prosecution or the defense.297

But Rule

804(b)(3) does not apply evenhandedly its demand for "corroborat
ing circumstances clearly indicat[ing] . . . trustworthiness."298
This language in Rule 804(b)(3) was not part of the package
upon which the Court itself passed in transmitting the original set of
federal rules to Congress.

Rather, the language represents the

product of the legislative process, wherein the fear was that the de
fendant herself might seek to corroborate an out-of-court confes295. See generally FED. R. Evm. 104(b).
296. The precise degree of corroboration required by the rule remains unclear. See Peter
W. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitu
tionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 958-59 (1981); cf.
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 1982) (reading requirement of
"clear[ ]" corroboration as codifying the holding in Chambers).
297. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
.
298. Notwithstanding that the text of the rule applies this heightened standard only to
exculpatory statements offered by the defense, some lower courts have extended it to incul
patory statements against interest offered by the prosecution in order to avoid unspecified
"constitutional difficulties." See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978);
see also United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990) (following Alvarez). The
seemingly more straightforward alternative would be simply to strike down the heightened
standard of corroboration applicable to exculpatory statements offered by the defense. For
an argument that the heightened standard of Rule 804(b)(3) is unconstitutional under the
Supreme Court's cases on the right to present witnesses, see Tague, supra note 296, at 100011.
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sion from someone else in an effort to shed doubt upon her own
guilt.299 In the face of a constitutional demand for a compelling
governmental interest, however, that policy justification should not
pass muster.300 Such an out-of-court statement would be transpar
ently dubious in the sense that the prosecution readily could high
light its potential for unreliability - especially,

if

the defendant

herself happens to be the witness attesting to an out-of-court con
fession by another, now-unavailable person. In other words, the
adversarial process itself would serve to guard against the ill
considered acceptance of such a statement by the jury.
There is, however, at least one discriminatory feature of the cur
rent federal rules that likely would survive strict scrutiny.

2. Rule 412
By its terms, Rule

412

generally prohibits the admission of evi

dence concerning the prior sexual "behavior" or "predisposition" of
"any alleged victim" in "any . . . criminal proceeding involving al
leged sexual misconduct."301 Rule

412

thus protects not only the

victim in a prosecution for rape, among other sexual offenses, but
also pattern witnesses whom the prosecution might call to testify
about similar instances of sexual misconduct by the defendant in
299. Tue House Report explains the rationale for this change:
[Tue House Committee] believed . . . that statements . . . tending to exculpate the ac
cused are more suspect and so should have their admissibility conditioned upon some
further provision insuring trustworthiness. Tue [Advisory Committee] proposal in the
[version of the rule transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court] to add a require
ment of simple corroboration was, however, deemed ineffective to accomplish this pur
pose since the accused's own testimony might suffice while not necessarily increasing the
reliability of the hearsay statement. Tue Committee settled upon the language 'unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement' as af
fording a proper standard and degree of discretion.

H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 16 (1973),

reprinted in

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7089-90.

300. If anything, the current preoccupation with "mechanistic[ ]" applications of evidence
rules, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), may afford defendants too little
protection against discriminatory rules. For instance, in LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253
(9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's counterpart to
Rule 804(b)(3) on the ground that the trial judge's finding of insufficient corroboration was
not "mechanistic" but, instead, stemmed from "the [defendant's] proffer and the corroborat
ing and contradicting circumstances" presented in the particular case. 133 F.3d at 1267. This
analysis completely misses the central point that the rule systematically disfavors defendants
by subjecting them to a heightened standard of corroboration in the first place.
301. FED. R. Evm. 412(a). The term "sexual behavior" includes "all activities that in
volve actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual
intercourse or sexual contact," such as use of contraceptives, birth of an illegitimate child, or
diagnosis of venereal disease. The reference to "sexual predisposition" is "designed to ex
clude evidence that . . . the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the
factfinder," such as "the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle." FED. R. Evm.
412 advisory committee's note.
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the past.302 Like the heightened standard of corroboration in Rule
804(b )(3), Rule 412 had its genesis in Congress rather than the
usual rulemaking process involving the Court.303
One might try to characterize Rule 412 as evenhanded on its
face, in that it bars a particular type of evidence without explicit
reference to the side seeking its admission.

The relatively few

sources to address the issue consider Rule 412 to exclude evidence
of a victim's

lack of sexual "behavior" when offered by the prosecu

tion.304 That premise is open to doubt, as the words "behavior" and
"predisposition," when used in ordinary parlance, both imply posi
tive action or inclination - something that only the defendant
would wish to raise in an effort to support a defense of consent.
Even

if

one were to assume the applicability of Rule 412 to the

prosecution in extraordinary situations, one cannot plausibly deem
the rule evenhanded in any realistic sense. It virtually always

will

be the defense that would wish to raise the victim's sexual "behav
ior" or "predisposition." Not surprisingly, the legislative history of
Rule 412 reveals no awareness, much less any affirmative desire,
that the rule should limit the prosecution. Indeed, insofar as a lack
of evenhandedness in the structure of the rule itself serves as a sur
rogate for distrust of the rulemaking process, there is reason for
concern here. If criminal defendants are not an especially palatable
cause in political terms, defendants in sex cases are an exceedingly
unpalatable one. Rule 412, in short, is the analogue in the law of
evidence to the prohibition in Lukumi upon animal sacrifice as part
of religious exercise.305 Rule 412 focuses upon a particular type of
evidence, the admission of which

will

be sought by defendants vir

tually exclusively.
302. See FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note ("Rule 412 extends to 'pattern'
witnesses in both criminal and civil cases whose testimony about other instances of sexual
misconduct by the person accused is otherwise admissible."); cf. FED. R. Evm. 413 & 414
(deeming admissible evidence of the defendant's "commission" of other offenses of "sexual
assault" or "child molestation," respectively).
303. The major features of Rule 412 originally were enacted by Congress in 1978, outside
the ordinary rulemaking process in which the Court plays a part See FED. R. Evm. 412 note.
The current text of the rule is, however, the product of the Advisory Committee's effort in
the early 1990s to "diminish some of the confusion engendered by the original rule and to
expand the protection afforded alleged victims of sexual misconduct." See FED. R. Evm. 412
advisory committee's note.
304. At least one federal district court has stated that Rule 412 bars evidence of the
victim's lack of sexual "behavior." See Vrrgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936-37
(D.V.I. 1986) (construing original version of Rule 412, which referred only to sexual "behav
ior"); see also 23 CHAru.Es ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETii W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRA.c.
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5387, at 577 (1980) (asserting, in passing, that Rule 412 excludes
evidence of the victim's virginity "when offered by the prosecution").
305. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
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In his analysis of the right to present witnesses, Peter Westen
casts significant doubt upon rape shield rules such as Rule 412, con
tending that evidence of the victim's consent to sex in the past must
be admitted for the defense as long as "reasonable people could
differ about [its] probative value."306 In its current form, Rule 412
seeks to address possible constitutional problems by including an
explicit exception for instances in which the exclusion of evidence
concerning the victim's sexual behavior or predisposition "would
violate the constitutional rights of the defendant."307 A reading
that would admit such evidence whenever "reasonable people could
differ" about its probative value would, in all likelihood, require the
courts to construe the constitutional exception so broadly as to en
feeble the general prohibition. In particular, such a view would ap
pear to elevate the right to present witnesses to such a level as to be
beyond even a compelling justification to the contrary.
In contrast to the constitutional analysis of Rule 804{b)(3), there
is good reason to think that Rule 412 should pass strict scrutiny,
notwithstanding its lack of evenhandedness. The core rationale be
hind Rule 412 - the government's interest in encouraging the re
porting of crimes involving sexual misconduct by protecting victims
in the trial process itself.3°8 - is quite powerful indeed. And the
federal circuits are on solid ground in turning away constitutional
challenges to state law equivalents of Rule 412 based upon the right
to present witnesses.309 At the very least, one can say confidently
306. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 209. For other accounts of the
constitutional issues surrounding Rule 412 - albeit that take as given the conception of the
right to present witnesses as an entitlement to exceptions - see, e.g., Harriett R. Galvin,
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70
MINN. L. REv. 763, 802-08 (1986); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 556-60 (1980).
307. FED. R. EVID. 412{b){l)(C). The one example cited by the Advisory Committee to
illustrate this constitutional exception is Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 {1988). See FED. R.
EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. Olden did not concern the admission of a third-party
defense witness but, instead, held that a rape defendant must be permitted to inquire on
cross-examination into the victim's cohabitation with another man at the time of the incident
in an effort to show bias. The defense in Olden sought thereby to suggest that the victim had
fabricated the rape charge in order to account for her consensual sexual intercourse with the
defendant. See 488 U.S. at 230. As such, Olden sounds in the constitutional right to confron
tation rather than the right to present witnesses. See 488 U.S. at 232 {describing the trial
court's denial of the opportunity to impeach for bias through cross-examination as a "Con
frontation Clause error[ ]").
308.

See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.

309. See, e.g., Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 874 {10th Cir. 1997); Stephens v. Miller,
13 F.3d 998, 1002 {7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 391 {4th Cir. 1991).
For its part, the Supreme Court has upheld against a facial attack a state law equivalent to the
requirement of Rule 412{c) that the defense must give notice of its plans to introduce evi
dence of the victim's prior sexual behavior and that, absent such notice, such evidence shall
be excluded. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 {1991).
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that the adversarial process - far from allaying concern over the
admission of the disputed evidence, as it would for out-of-court
confessions under Rule 804(b )(3) - actually is the major source of
the problem. The fundamental insight behind Rule 412 rests upon
the recognition that subjecting the victim to the adversarial process,
in itself, will deter the reporting of sex crimes, and the rule focuses
its exclusionary force only upon the particular class of crimes for
which that deterrent effect is most pronounced. Here, "reasonable
people" might very well differ about the probative value of a vic
tim's sexual "behavior" or "predisposition," but that should not be
sufficient to justify widespread exceptions to Rule 412 based upon
the constitutional right to present witµesses.310 Rule 412, in short,
passes strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should reconceive the right to present wit
nesses as a right to equal treatment rather than an entitlement to
exceptions from generally applicable evidence rules.

Historical

context, the closely related right to confrontation, structural consid
erations, analogous constitutional decisions, and sheer practical
concern for the protection of the defendants as a whole, together,
form a powerful case for such a shift. An equality-based view of the
right would provide the Court with ample authority to police situa
tions in which the rulemaking process has not taken seriously the
interests of criminal defendants while, at the same time, avoiding
the endangerment of core, evenhanded principles of evidence law
that have existed for centuries. In this manner, the Court may
bridge more amicably the law of evidence and the Constitution.

310. The analysis presented here would leave undisturbed the application of the constitu
tional exception in Rule 412(b)(l)(C) based upon the separate guarantee of the Confronta
tion Clause. See supra note 307 (discussing advisory committee's reference to Olden).

